The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility by Johnson, Sheri Lynn
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
Volume 1
1996 
The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility 
Sheri Lynn Johnson 
Cornell Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheri L. Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 
(1996). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol1/iss2/1 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE COLOR OF TRUTH: RACE AND
THE ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY
Sheri Lynn Johnson*
IN TRO D U CTIO N ................................................................................... 263
I. UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECT OF RACE ON CREDIBILITY
D ETERM IN ATIONS .................................................................................. 266
A. A Brief and Selective History of Race and Credibility in the
C ourts ............................................................................................. 267
B. Modem Race and Credibility Cases ............................................... 276
1. Two High Profile Cases .......................................................... 276
a. W illiam Jackson ...................................................................... 276
b. C larence Brandley .................................................................. 277
2. Barry Lee Fairchild ................................................................. 280
a. T he Facts ................................................................................. 280
b. The Legal Claim ..................................................................... 285
3. Leroy Joseph "Ricky" Drayton .............................................. 292
a. T he Facts ................................................................................. 292
b. The Legal C laim ..................................................................... 298
4. Other Modem Examples ........................................................ 304
a. Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases ............................................ 305
b .Juror A ccounts ....................................................................... 308
c. Supreme Court References ...................................................... 309
C. The Psychological Dynamics of Race and Credibility
A ssessm en ts .................................................................................... 312
II. CONTROLS ON RACIALLY INFLUENCED CREDIBILITY
D ETERM IN ATIONS ................................................................................ 317
A. Legal Devices for Reviewing Race-Based Credibility Screening
by A dvocates .................................................................................. 318
1. D efense A ttorneys ................................................................... 318
2. Prosecutors ............................................................................... 319
* Professor, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1979,
Yale Law School. This article owes its existence to my clients, Barry Lee Fairchild,
who was executed by the State of Arkansas on August 31, 1995, and Ricky Drayton,
now on death row in South Carolina. I am grateful to Stephen Garvey, Steven
Clymer, John Siliciano, Nancy Cooke, and Winnie Taylor for their comments.
261
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
B. Legal Devices for Regulating Racially Influenced Assessments
of Credibility at the Guilt Adjudication Stage ................................ 320
1. V oir D ire ................................................................................... 320
2. Inflammatory Arguments ...................................................... 321
3. Juror M isconduct ..................................................................... 322
4. Proof of Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ........................ 324
C. Legal Devices for Controlling the Influence of Race on
Credibility Assessments in the Post-Conviction Process .............. 325
1. State Post-Conviction Proceedings ....................................... 325
2. Federal Habeas Corpus .......................................................... 326
M. PREVENTING RACIALLY BIASED CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS .... 327
A. Substantive Restrictions on the Credibility Inferences That
May Be Drawn from Race .............................................................. 327
1. Inferences from Race to Truthfulness .................................. 328
a. Witness-Specific Racial Motivations ...................................... 329
b. Racial Characteristics ............................................................. 330
c. Racial Propensity .................................................................... 330
d. Intraracial Alibis or Other Exonerating Testimony .............. 331
e. Intraracial Accusations or Other Inculpatory Testimony ...... 332
f. Interracial Alibis or Other Exculpatory Testimony ................ 333
g. Interracial Accusations or Other Inculpatory Testimony ...... 335
2. Inferences from Race to Accuracy ........................................ 336
a. Witness-Specific Abilities ....................................................... 336
b. Racial Characteristics ............................................................. 337
c. Intraracial Identifications ....................................................... 338
d. Interracial Identifications ....................................................... 338
e. Interpretive Competence ......................................................... 339
B. Mechanisms for Enforcing Prohibited Race and Credibility
Inferences ........................................................................................ 339
1. Incorporating Constraints on Race and Credibility
Inferences into Existing Legal Mechanisms ........................ 339
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ............................................ 340
b. Inflammatory Questions and Arguments .............................. 341
c. Juror Misconduct Allegations ................................................ 341
d. Habeas Corpus Review of State Factual Findings ................. 342
2. Creating a Mechanism for Constraining
Unconstitutional Credibility Determinations ..................... 342
C O N C LU SIO N ........................................................................................ 345
[VOL. 1:2
Race & Credibility
Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.1
The truth will make us free.
The truth will make us free,
The truth will make us free someday.
Oh deep in my heart, I do believe,
We shall overcome someday.2
INTRODUCTION
Everything we want to believe about truth and justice is that
there is one truth, a color-blind truth, which, in the end, will lead to
justice. On the other hand, anyone familiar with the American his-
tory must admit that the truth has not always set people free in this
country. Are race-based assessments of credibility a thing of the
past? "White lies" still refer to harmless, socially useful fibs, and
"black lies" mean evil, irredeemable falsehoods. Are these idioms
meaningless anachronisms? Just what color is the truth that will
make us free today?
The verdict in the first Rodney King beating trial was a seminal
event for many Americans. For some, the trial underlined the fla-
grancy of racial injustice; for others, it reopened racial justice issues
they had thought-or had wished to think-were closed. I start with
the Rodney King verdict not because it is a prototypic example of
the problem I want to address, but because it is still such a promi-
nent racial justice icon that a shorthand, so convenient for
introductions, is possible. It was difficult for most of us to watch the
videotape of police officers beating Rodney King, listen to their tes-
timony, and understand how the first jury could have found Officers
Powell, Koon, and Briseno credible. Were they believed because
they were white, as was most of the jury? The Latina juror in the
state case reported that she had been mocked for her desire to re-
view the videotape, saying that "it's like they wanted to see what
they wanted to see.'
There are at least two responses that believers in color-blind
truth can make. First, they might explain that the problem was that
Rodney King did not take the stand to provide a human version of
the videotape's truth. That Powell and Koon were later convicted in
the federal trial, in which King did testify, lends some support to
1. John 8:32.
2. WE SHALL OVERCOME, traditional folk song.
3. Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, The Rodney King Verdict and Voir Dire, 207
N.Y.L.J. 1003, 1006 (1992).
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this theory. If correct, however, this theory simply moves the
credibility issue one step back in time, for it leads to the question of
why the state prosecutors chose to keep King off the stand.
A second swing from the color-blind comer might be that this
case was not about credibility at all, but about a warped notion of
just deserts: the jurors did not believe the police officers but acquit-
ted them anyway. This response suggests that if there is a problem, I
have focused on the wrong one; the real problem is actually one of
animosity and jury nullification. As an empirical matter, I suspect
this is half right,4 but not the full story. There is some evidence that
the jury at least thought the officers were acting lawfully, and cer-
tainly some trial observers claimed to have concluded, based on the
evidence, that no unlawful brutality had occurred.s It is, of course,
difficult to determine whether "good-faith," but racially influenced,
determinations of credibility had been made, or whether fact finders
had in "bad faith" disregarded credibility to act upon racial animos-
ity or some other impermissible motive.
Although racially mediated determinations of credibility may
interact with other racial motivations to produce an unjust verdict,
and in some settings these several strands may be impossible to
separate completely, this article nevertheless attempts to narrow the
focus to race and credibility assessments. There are three reasons for
doing so.
First, the issue of what influence race may properly have on
credibility is a complicated one, and, unlike an absolute prohibition
against racial animosity, an absolute prohibition of all considerations
of race in credibility determinations may not be desirable, even in
theory. Let me call on another (although, in my view, more prob-
lematic) racial justice icon, the O.J. Simpson case.6 From the
beginning, polls revealed that African Americans and white Ameri-
cans viewed the likelihood of Simpson's guilt in radically different7
ways. It seems clear that this difference relates to the mistrust with
which African Americans view the accusations of a white police
4. One juror in a post trial interview said, "[H]e [King] deserved what he got." Id.
at 1003.
5. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Maybe the Jury Was Right, AM. LAW., June 1992, at 7.
Prior to defending his view that the jury was correct, Parloff rhetorically, but only
rhetorically, asks, "Am I out of my mind? A fascist? A racist? (I'm White.)" Id.
6. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995).
7. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, In Simpson Case, an Issue for Everyone: Class and Race
Concerns Beginning to Emerge as Dividing Factors, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1994, at A16
(citing poll in which 62 percent of whites, but only 38 percent of Blacks, said that
they believed that Simpson was "very likely or somewhat likely guilty").
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officer.8 Although we could easily condemn an acquittal of Simpson
based on simple animosity toward white police officers, the appro-
priate stance toward a juror's heightened skepticism of a white police
officer's accusations against a Black defendant is less self-evident.
On the normative front, doubts about the appropriateness of an ab-
solute ban of racial considerations are certainly strengthened by the
fact that suspicion of bias turned out to be eminently warranted with
respect to Officer Mark Fuhrman; on the positive front, the Supreme
Court's own recent unself-conscious use of race in assessing the
credibility of a habeas corpus petitioner's witness suggests the ab-
sence of an absolute rule.9
A second reason for treating the influence of race on credibility
assessments as an analytically distinct issue lies in the fact that ra-
cially biased assessments of credibility may occur in the absence of
overt-or even covert-racial animosity. If we wait for proof of ra-
cial animosity, we may be sidetracked. Even when animosity is
present, we may not find evidence of it. Perhaps more important, as
the Barry Lee Fairchild case'0 illustrates and as I will discuss at
length in the body of this paper, race may inappropriately skew the
credibility determinations of perfectly respectable judges who do
not seem to manifest any animosity, racial or otherwise, toward Af-
rican American litigants.
A third reason to divorce race and credibility assessments from
more generalized discussions of racial justice and animosity lies in
the present state of the law concerning prejudiced decision makers.
To entirely remove racial animosity (or its modern counterpart,
aversive racism) from the courtroom would require changes in the
racial identities of decision makers. At least in the areas of voir dire"
and peremptory challenge law, however, the Supreme Court seems
to have called a halt to such changes. It also has clearly signaled its
8. See, e.g., Janet Elder, Trial Leaves Public Split on Racial Lines, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2,
1995, at B9 (citing poll reporting that just 37 percent of African Americans have a
high level of confidence in their local police and that 28 percent of African Ameri-
cans expected to be treated more harshly than other persons in a hypothetical
encounter with a police officer).
9. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 858 n.18 (1995) (referring to affiant's race);
see also discussion infra Part I.B.4.c.ii.
10. See infra Part I.B.2.
11. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (upholding trial court's refusal to
allow voir dire of jury venire to ascertain racial bias in case involving Black defen-
dant and white victim).
12. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that prosecutor's
basis for peremptory strikes was race neutral even though language proficiency was
a factor in exercising the strikes); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Cul-
ture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993).
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disinterest in systemic proofs of discriminatory outcomes.13 If such
larger projects are not presently feasible, smaller ones may be.
Thus, this article will address specifically the relationship be-
tween race and credibility in legal cases, while acknowledging that
broader bias issues are often, though sometimes imperceptibly, in-
tertwined in racially biased credibility determinations. Part I will
survey race and credibility issues that have arisen in courts, with
particular focus on two modern habeas corpus cases. Part II will
summarize the legal rules that presently regulate racially influenced
assessments of credibility; it may surprise some readers to realize
that there is no established mechanism for challenging racially bi-
ased credibility determinations. Part I will propose some standards
for determining when race is permissibly used in credibility deter-
minations and some mechanisms for enforcing those standards.
Although my sources and primary concern in this article are crimi-
nal cases, most of what follows has relevance to civil cases as well,
albeit to a lesser extent.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECT OF RACE
ON CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
Another response that the wishfully color-blind might make to
the race credibility issues raised in the Rodney King beating case
and the O.J. Simpson murder trial is that they are anomalies. Be-
cause a doctrinal category for judging race and credibility claims has
not been established, it is impossible to resolve this anomaly argu-
ment by counting reported cases that discuss such claims. Instead,
this section disputes this possible contention through a brief and
largely nondoctrinal review of the history of race and credibility de-
terminations in this country. In addition, this section will provide an
extended exploration of two modern egregious cases, supplemented
by a discussion of the psychological dynamics of race and credibility
determinations. For those readers not needing persuasion that race
and credibility issues are worthy of attention, this section should
function as a summary of the range of forms these issues have taken.
13. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1982) (holding that a statistical
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty based on the race of the victim and




A. A Brief and Selective History of Race
and Credibility in the Courts
Prior to the Civil War, the color of truth was frequently man-
dated by statute. 4 In general, slaves could not testify against
whites. 5 Although some northern states such as Massachusetts pur-
ported to treat testimony without reference to the race of the
witness,16 legal incompetence to testify based on race was not limited
to the South. For example, even though very early case law in New
York permitted slaves to testify against other Black persons and
even against white persons,17 the 1702 slave code prohibited slave
testimony in any matter except in cases pertaining to conspiracies
among slaves where the testimony would be used against another
slave, a provision substantially reenacted in 1730.'8 Until the aboli-
tion of slavery in New York a century later, slaves could only serve
as witnesses in criminal cases against other slaves.
Lest we become sidetracked by formal distinctions between
disabilities based on slave status and those based on race, other
statutory provisions, sometimes slightly less drastic, imposed a tes-
timonial disability based on race itself. For example, a 1785 New
York statute precluded all testimony by any Black person against
any white person. 9 In Pennsylvania, from 1700 to 1780, free Black
persons were prohibited from testifying in regular courts against
whites. 2' Slaves were so disabled until 1847.2' Beginning in 1702 and
apparently lasting through the Civil War, Virginia limited the ad-
missibility of testimony by African Americans to criminal cases in
which the defendant was Black and civil cases in which all parties
were Black.2 By the early 1800s, such provisions were typical for
slave states23 One 1831 South Carolina case even held that no Black
14. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, 58, 119-20,
124, 133, 139, 142, 146, 205-06, 258, 299 (1978) (describing various state statutes con-
cerning the participation of slaves and free African-Americans in civil and criminal
proceedings).
15. For an extended discussion of slave evidentiary rules, see Thomas D. Morris,
Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1209 (1993).
16. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 85.
17. See id. at 104, 112.
18. See id. at 133.
19. See id. at 139.
20. See id. at 282.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 58.
23. See Morris, supra note 15, at 1210.
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person could testify in any civil suit, regardless of the race of the
parties. 4
In 1866 Congress enacted a statute which forbade deprivation
under color of law of several specifically enumerated rights, includ-
ing the rights to sue, to be parties, and to give evidence. 2 Although
discriminatory treatment of the value of Black and white testimony
therefore ended with Reconstruction, both law and lore document
the persistence of race-based assessments of credibility throughout
the Jim Crow era.
Perhaps the best known example of such color-suffused views
of truth is Harper Lee's depiction of Alabama justice in the 1930s in
her novel To Kill a Mockingbird.26 The novel won unprecedented liter-
ary honors in 1960 and later became an Academy Award-winning
movie starring Gregory Peck as the upstanding white lawyer, Atti-
cus Finch.2 The novel recounts the story of an African American,
Tom Robinson, on trial for the rape of a white woman, Maybella
Ewell.29 Because there are no eyewitnesses, the case is largely his
word against hers. The skillful defense lawyer elicits testimony from
the defendant, from the alleged victim, and from the alleged victim's
father. The testimony makes it clear what the outcome would be
were this a color-blind proceeding.' On all the standard indicia of
reliability, the defendant should be believed and acquitted. The
complaining witness is nervous, hostile and evasive. She contradicts
herself. She has a motive to lie. She is not a responsible person; she is
either pathetically deprived or worthless trash, depending on the
generosity of one's outlook.3' The defendant is quite different. His
demeanor is respectful and straightforward. He has no particular
motive for committing the crime. He is a hard worker and has been
involved only in a minor disorderly conduct case.32 But what is con-
clusive to the child narrator is the objective evidence that contradicts
24. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 206.
25. See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866). In 1874 the enumera-
tion of protected rights was expanded to protect "any rights, privileges, or
immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States...
"18 U.S.C. § 242 (1989).
26. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
27. See Timothy Hoff, Influences on Harper Lee: An Introduction to the Symposium,
45 ALA. L. REv. 389-90 (1994).
28. The moral correctness of Finch has been hotly debated. See Claudia Johnson,
Without Tradition and Within Reason, 45 ALA. L. REV. 483, 483-84 (1994) (reviewing
controversy touched off by Monroe Freedman's criticisms of Finch as a role model
for lawyers).
29. See LEE, supra note 26.
30. See id. at 187-210.
31. See id. at 191-200.
32. See id. at 202-210.
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the complaining witness' account: the defendant could not have hit
the purported victim and slung her to the floor in the manner she
describes, for his right arm is shriveled and useless due to a child-
hood cotton gin accident." What is obvious to the child is that
Maybella Ewell is lying (in part to cover a beating by her father) and
that Tom Robinson is guilty of no more than feeling sorry for Ewell.
But what is obvious to the racially naive narrator is not obvious to
the jury, which expeditiously convicts the defendant.34
A 1994 symposium in the Alabama Law Review devoted to To Kill
a Mockingbird' attests to its continuing influence on the legal imagi-
nation. As the next section will demonstrate, there are good
empirical reasons for this fascination, not all of them relics of a by-
gone era. Although the reported cases from the first hundred years
after the Civil War rarely have such rich factual detail, they too de-
pict a reliance on race as a proxy for credibility.
In Brown v. Mississippi,"' a 1934 jury convicted three African
American defendants of murder on the strength of uncorroborated
confessions that the defendants later repudiated at trial. They testi-
fied that the police had obtained these confessions through torture
(with one defendant hanged and then let down and all the defen-
dants whipped until they confessed) and then compelled them to
conform their confessions to the details specified by their interroga-
tors.37 No one denied the hanging or severe whippings, but a deputy
involved declared that the torture was "[n]ot too much for a ne-
gro. '" Indeed, confession law is replete with cases of Black
defendants who were physically coerced into confessions39 and
whom juries convicted despite uncontradicted evidence of such co-
ercion.
Chambers v. Florida4° involved a police dragnet for the murder of
a white man in which twenty-five to forty African American sus-
pects were questioned; after five days of continuous questioning,
four suspects confessed.4 The suspects were found guilty after the
33. See id. at 197-98.
34. See id. at 223. For a more recent account of Jim Crow justice that does not glo-
rify the role of the white lawyer, see ERNESr GAINEs, A LESSON BEFORE DYING (1993).
35. Symposium, To Kill a Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REv. 389 (1994).
36. 297 U.S. 278, 279-80 (1936).
37. See id. at 281-82.
38. Id. at 284.
39. Prior to Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of the
Elaine, Arkansas, defendants, which also involved confessions obtained through
brutal torture, but decided it on a more generic mob domination theory. See Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
40. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
41. See id. at 229-35.
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jury determined their confessions to be voluntary. 2 Justice Black,
while noting that the defendants in egregious abuse cases were vir-
tually always "the poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the
friendless, and the powerless," neglected to mention that among
those who were poor and ignorant, and consequently suffered from
such torture, Black defendants were apparently the least likely to be
believed when they repudiated their confessions at trial, for it was
only in those cases that the Court found convictions to review.4
Evidence of differing standards of credibility is not, however,
limited to confession law. Many of the celebrated miscarriages of
justice from this period involve racial prejudice, and a surprising
number involve apparently biased determinations of credibility. The
most widely recognized case, that of the Scottsboro Boys,4' began
with a credibility determination that was plausible, which is not to
say that anything else about the trial was reasonable." The two pur-
ported white rape victims testified to gang rape by nine Black
defendants, a story in part corroborated by witnesses and bolstered
by physical evidence of recent sexual intercourse. Moreover, one of
the defendants under cross-examination accused the others of raping
the two women.47 When these convictions were reversed by the Su-
preme Court based on the denial of access to counsel," Haywood
Patterson was the first defendant to be retried.49 This second case
implicated the jury as well as the wider community, for one of the
two alleged rape victims denied that she had ever been attacked by
the defendants, denied witnessing an attack on her companion, ad-
mitted that the other woman had coached her testimony, and
revealed that the other woman had coached the testimony of several
white boys, threatening them with the specter of Mann Act prosecu-
tions if they did not tell the story with which she had provided
them."° One of the white boys confirmed this story, yet the white jury
nevertheless convicted Patterson after deliberating only five
42. See MICHAEL RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 294 (1992).
43. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 238.
44. Unfortunately, not all such coerced confession cases made it into the Supreme
Court Reports.
45. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969);
RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 116-18.
46. The defendants were denied any meaningful access to counsel, and the trial
was conducted under machine guns manned by the National Guard. See CARTER,
supra note 45, at 22-23; RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 117-18. The jury was all
white and all male. RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 117.
47. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 117.
48. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. See CARTER, supra note 45, at 203.
50. See id. at 204-34.
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minutes.5' When the trial judge ordered a new trial based on the
weight of the evidence, a third jury again convicted.52
Eventually the Supreme Court reversed this round of convic-
tions based on the illegality of the jury composition,,3 but many
other cases involving obviously biased credibility determinations
occurred that evaded Supreme Court review, including subsequent
prosecutions of Norris and Patterson.s4 Edwin M. Borchard, in his
1932 classic Convicting the Innocent, scrupulously documented eight
wrongful convictions of African American defendants.5 Borchard's
focus was not race, but his recitation of the facts makes it clear that
four of these wrongful convictions resulted from a racially tinged
inability to detect perjury,6 and two more cases were obviously at-
tributable to jury disregard for the testimony of truthful Black
defense witnesses in favor of weak circumstantial evidence.7
A more recent book, In Spite of Innocence, by Michael Radelet,
Hugo Bedau and Constance Putnam, catalogues wrongful capital
convictions and includes additional cases in which racially skewed
determinations of credibility appear to have contributed to wrongful
convictions during the Jim Crow era." One famous case recounted in
the book, that of the Groveland Three, involved a rape charge fabri-
cated by the alleged victim's husband to avoid suspicion by the
alleged victim's parents that he had again beaten her.' Four young
men were accused of kidnapping and raping the white woman and
assaulting her husband. A lynch mob shot one man to death,60 and a
jury convicted the other three.6' After the Supreme Court reversed
51. See id. at 239-240.
52. See RIcHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTIcE 148-49 (1975).
53. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
54. Norris was reconvicted and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted
to life imprisonment, and forty-seven years after the first conviction, he was granted
an unconditional pardon by the State of Alabama. Patterson was also reconvicted,
but he was sentenced to life, escaped to Michigan, and successfully fought extradi-
tion to Alabama. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 118.
55. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONvICrING THE INNOcENT (1932).
56. See id. at 33-45, 165-69, 304-08 (describing cases of J.B. Brown, Louise Butler
and George Yelder, John Murchison, and Moses Walker).
57. See id. at 23-32 (describing cases of Payne Boyd and William Broughton).
58. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 118.
59. See id. at 107.
60. See id. at 103.
61. See id. at 109. The three defendants were convicted in the first trial despite a
lack of medical evidence of the rape, inconsistent prior identifications from the
complaining couple, mention of confessions but a failure to introduce any confes-
sions into evidence (probably because only two of the defendants had confessed,
both supplying incomplete confessions after being tortured) and the denials of all
three defendants. See id. at 107-09. Nevertheless, the credibility determination at the
first trial seems somewhat plausible, in part because the state's case was bolstered by
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the convictions of the two defendants that had been sentenced to
death,"' the sheriff shot both on the way back to trial, purportedly to
prevent the escape of the two men, who were handcuffed to each
other.6 One, Walter Lee Irvin, survived despite bullet wounds to the
chest, neck and head and was subsequently tried." Despite the
prosecution's failure to produce any medical evidence that the
woman had been raped by anyone, despite the inconsistencies of
prior identifications, despite the lack of any confession (the remain-
ing defendant had continuously insisted on his innocence, despite
pretrial torture and interrogation during his hospitalization after
being shot by the sheriff), despite new expert testimony that the
casts of the defendant's shoes had been made with empty boots (i.e.,
they had been planted there) and despite excellent lawyering by
Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg, the all-white jury again
convicted and sentenced the defendant to the electric chair. 65 The
Supreme Court declined to review the conviction." That the Gover-
nor of Florida eventually commuted the death sentence underscores
the dubious nature of the jury's credibility judgment.67
In Spite of Innocence also recounts three sexual assault cases in-
volving rape charges against a Black defendant from a white com-
plaining witness where a color-blind view of the evidence presented
at trial would have probably led the jury to conclude that the sexual
encounter in question was consensual.' Two of these defendants
were executed and one died in prison." In Spite of Innocence and
plaster casts of footprints and tire tracks matching the car of one defendant and the
boots of another which the sheriff claimed to have made at the scene of the abduc-
tion. See id. at 108.
62. See id. at 109.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 111-12.
66. See id. at 112.
67. See id. at 113.
68. Jess Hollins' alleged victim's allegations came after her brother-in-law came
upon the pair engaging in sex. Hollins testified that he and his alleged victim en-
gaged in consensual sexual intercourse after they met at a dance, and defense
witnesses testified that she frequented Black dance halls and that she had a reputa-
tion for promiscuity. See id. at 136-37. In the case of Roosevelt Collins, a woman who
weighed thirty pounds more than Collins charged him with rape when white farm-
ers came upon them in a field. Collins maintained that the woman had consented to
sex. See id. at 137-38. Willie McGee was convicted in Mississippi after two and a half
minutes of jury deliberations, despite the fact that the "victim's" husband and chil-
dren were asleep in the next room during the time of the alleged attack and never
heard any commotion. See id. at 332-33. Finally, in the case of William Henry Ander-
son, the alleged victim had not resisted, screamed or used an available pistol to
resist. Later affidavits showed a history of a prior sexual relationship. See id. at 282.
In two of these cases, there is extrajudicial evidence that the jury may not have be-
lieved the complaining witness, but found her consent irrelevant.
69. See id. at 137, 138, 333.
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Convicting the Innocent provide at least nine additional pre-Civil
Rights era cases of extraordinary credibility determinations proba-
bly influenced by race.7°
In Spite of Innocence limits its survey to capital cases, about
which far more factual information is usually available. It seems
remiss, however, to leave the subject of wrongful convictions tainted
by racially biased credibility determinations without at least men-
tioning the case of Rubin Carter, a Black boxer who was twice
convicted of murdering three whites in Patterson, New Jersey, in
1966. 7' The evidence against "Hurricane" Carter was very weak, and
Carter steadfastly maintained his own innocence.72 The prosecutor
furthered the case against Carter by arguing racial motivation, de-
spite a lack of any supporting evidence. Eventually, a federal writ
of habeas corpus was granted, and there is presently little dispute
that Carter was wrongfully convicted. 74 The amount of effort
70. See id. at 288 (describing conviction of Payne Boyd for murder despite the
testimony of 31 witnesses who said he was not Cleveland Boyd, who was known to
be the real killer); BORCHARD, supra note 55, at 23-28 (same); RADELET ET AL., supra
note 42, at 290 (describing conviction of J.B. Brown on disputed jailhouse confession
reported by cellmates); BORCHARD, supra note 55, at 33-39 (same); RADELET AT AL.,
supra note 42, at 297 (describing conviction of the "Trenton Six"-Ralph Cooper,
Collis English, Forrest McKinlay, McKenzie Johnson, James Thorpe and Horace Wil-
son-based on coerced and inconsistent confessions, despite solid alibis for all six
defendants); id. at 294-95 (describing conviction of Leon Chambers in Mississippi in
1969 for killing a white police officer based on the testimony of one eyewitness, de-
spite the testimony of two witnesses at trial that a second man, who had confessed
but retracted his confession, had shot the officer); id. at 298 (describing conviction of
Willies Crutcher, Jim Hudson, John Murchison and Cleo Staten for the murder of a
white man, actually killed by his wife and nephew, based on conflicting and per-
jured testimony); BORCHARD, supra note 55, at 165-69 (offering a fuller account of the
Crutcher, Hudson, Murchison and Staten case that makes the credibility determina-
tion more suspicious); RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 312-13 (describing the
conviction of L.D. Harris solely on the basis of a confession coerced by physical
abuse and threats and later declared involuntary by the Supreme Court); id. at 346
(describing conviction of David Sherman in Tennessee based on the uncorroborated
statement of another defendant); id. at 351-52 (describing conviction of Earnest Wal-
lace in 1916 of murder on the testimony of one eyewitness, despite the testimony of
three eyewitnesses that the gunman was wearing a mask and despite the testimony
of three alibi witnesses); id. at 352 (describing conviction of Joseph Weaver in Ohio in
1927 based on the testimony of a codefendant, despite alibi witness testimony); id. at
356 (describing conviction of Lem Woon, in Oregon in 1908, despite an alibi defense
and the view of two state supreme court justices that the evidence was insufficient
for conviction).
71. See Ira Berkow, Justice Delayed Is Bitter Justice for Carter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1993, § 8, at 2.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. (noting that the judge who released Carter observed that "the extensive
record clearly demonstrates that [the] petitioners' convictions were predicated upon
an appeal to racism rather than reason, and concealment rather than disclosure").
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required to reverse his conviction was so enormous that it is not un-
reasonable to suspect that many other similar wrongful conviction
cases are not reversed simply because of the effort required.
Another area where one can examine the influence of race on
credibility determinations prior to the Civil Rights Era is prosecuto-
rial misconduct cases. A 1956 ALR annotation on counsel's appeals
to prejudice reveals two different patterns of racially biased argu-
mentation of credibility. The annotation includes ten cases in which
prosecutors argued that African Americans were inherently less
trustworthy as witnesses.76 In another six cases, the prosecutor ar-
gued that testimony by Black witnesses should be disbelieved
because Black people willingly lie for each other.7 Two other cases
involve a variation on the lying-for-each-other premise. In one, a
Black special prosecutor argued that the jury should be especiall
ready to convict because he was prosecuting another Black person.
In another case, the prosecutor argued that the defendant was not
even able to get a "Negro in that great concourse of Negroes" to tes-
tify for him.7 Yet another case involved a Chinese American
defendant, against whom the prosecutor argued both that Chinese
witnesses were inherently less truthful and that they were likely to
lie for each other'" A more radical way of looking at credibility de-
terminations in the century between the Reconstruction and the end
of the fight to maintain legal segregation is to consider lynching it-
self as a form, albeit the most abhorrent form, of racially biased
adjudications of credibility. Certainly lynching supplanted trial de-
terminations of credibility.8' Indeed, lynching may be seen as the
75. C.R. McCorkle, Annotation, Counsel's Appeal in Criminal Cases to Racial, Na-
tional, or Religious Prejudice as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, or Reversal, 45 A.L.R.2D
303 (1956).
76. See id. at 335-64 (discussing James v. State, 92 So. 909 (Ala. 1922); Jones v.
State, 109 So. 189 (Ala. 1926); Allen v. State, 112 So. 177 (Ala. 1927); State v. Lee, 40
So. 914 (La. 1906); Hardaway v. State, 54 So. 833 (Miss. 1911); Moseley v. State, 73 So.
791 (Miss. 1916); State v. Evans, 98 S.E. 788 (N.C. 1919); Arnold v. State, 256 S.W. 919
(Tex. Crim. App. 1923); Hilson v. State, 258 S.W. 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924); Little-
john v. State, 273 S.W. 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925)).
77. See id. at 333-66 (discussing Tannehill v. State, 48 So. 662 (Ala. 1909); Perdue
v. State, 86 So. 158 (Ala. 1920); State v. Howard, 45 So. 260 (La. 1907); Johnson v.
State, 127 S.W. 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910); Jordan v. State, 137 S.W. 133 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1911)).
78. See id. at 359 (discussing Camp v. State, 239 P.2d 1036 (Okla. 1952)).
79. See id. at 350 (discussing Hampton v. State, 40 So. 545 (Miss. 1906)).
80. See id. at 367 (discussing People v. Louie Foo, 44 P. 453 (Cal. 1896)).
81. Of course, many lynchings were carried out for purposes other than punish-
ment for a suspected crime-such as to terrorize and to intimidate. However, I refer
here to lynchings that purported to punish criminal activity. See generally Barbara
Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Pro-
gressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 31 (1996).
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post-Reconstruction equivalent of absolute bars to testimony by
Black persons in criminal cases with racial overtones. What the sus-
pected Black perpetrator, his friends, relatives, or neighbors might
have to say on the defendant's behalf was, effectively, incompetent
evidence. Given the phenomenal prevalence of lynching of African
Americans-by one conservative estimate, nearly 3500 lynchings
between 1882 and 1968,82 and by another estimate, 5000 from 1859 to
1962'-I am driven to the conclusion that the most egregious uses of
race in the assessment of credibility were extraordinarily common.
Even the reader who does not accept this analysis must concede that
the willingness to engage in lynching suggests a disparagement of
the value of African American voices, a disparagement that must
have been at play in contemporaneous courtroom determinations of
credibility, albeit in a less dramatic fashion.
Finally, the legal aftermath of lynchings and other Black vic-
tim/white perpetrator crimes provides another set of cases in which
race appears to have affected credibility determinations. The tradi-
tional refusal of white juries to convict white defendants accused of
crimes of violence against African American victims is notorious:
credible accusations backed by powerful physical evidence, coun-
tered only by obviously false denials, routinely led to acquittals.M Of
course, this problem can be characterized as one of jury nullification
rather than one of credibility.8 In cases where the victims were in-
volved in civil rights activities or the crime was racially motivated,
jury nullification is probably more likely; in other cases, given the
secrecy of jury deliberations, it is impossible to know which expla-
nation is more accurate.
What shall we do with this history? I certainly do not consider
myself a commentator who "proceed[s] as if there existed no dra-
matic discontinuities in the history of American race relations, as if
there existed little difference between the laws, practices and senti-
ments prevalent during the eras of slavery and de jure segregation
and those prevalent today... .""" Certainly the legal structures and, I
think, the psychological structures that constrain race and credibility
decisions are in some respects different from what they were fifty or
even thirty years ago. The foregoing section is meant to show that
82. See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-
1950 at 4-5 (19§0).
83. See RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHING 253 (2d ed. 1988).
84. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAw AND SOUTHERN ORDER 8-9 (1987)
("[Lynchers] had little to fear from those who administered the southern legal sys-
tem.").
85. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 61-62 (1994).
86. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, LAW AND CRIME (forthcoming 1997).
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and how "the burden of history weighs upon us" in the matter of
race and credibility determinations.
B. Modern Race and Credibility Cases
We need the history of race and credibility determinations in
part because the modem cases-those decided in the last twenty-
five years' -seldom wear their hearts on their digest headnotes.
Without history, the acquittals of Koon, Powell, Wind and Briseno
simply reflect the vagaries of jury determinations. Without history,
the Simpson acquittal is just the story of a wealthy man with expen-
sive lawyers trouncing advanced scientific evidence.
In view of this history, however, it is extremely likely that these
cases as well as several of the highly publicized cases of convicted-
then-exonerated Black defendants have involved errant and proba-
bly biased credibility determinations. Two of these cases are worth a
quick review here for the very different shapes of the credibility is-
sues that they raise.
1. Two High Profile Cases
a. William Jackson
William Jackson spent five years in prison for two rapes he did
not commit. 9 Two white women testified that they were certain
Jackson was their assailant, although it later developed that there
was only a rough resemblance between Jackson and the true perpe-
trator.90 Several Black alibi witnesses testified for the defense, but an
all-white jury convicted Jackson, who was exonerated after five
years imprisonment.9' This case raises several race and credibility
issues. First, was the jury too quick to dismiss the testimony of the
Black alibi witnesses? If so, why? Was it because they doubted the
inherent truthfulness of Black witnesses, or because they thought
these Black witnesses were likely to lie for another Black person? A
second kind of race and credibility question lurks in the Jackson
case: should the jury have discounted the eyewitness testimony
87. See id.
88. I am arbitrarily choosing 1970 as the dividing line for these cases, largely be-
cause the most violent resistance to the end of de jure segregation had ended by this
time. Although the cases do shift over time, I do not see any point of marked discon-
tinuity.





because of its cross-racial nature?92 A Black jury might have been
more likely to do so. Would that have been proper? None of these
questions imply a backdrop of racial animosity, nor was there evi-
dence that such animosity motivated Jackson's jury. Ironically, in
some of the modem cases, the charge of biased determinations of
credibility may sound more convincing than in the older cases,
largely because lower levels of overt racial antagonism render a
prominent alternative explanation-jury lawlessness-less likely.
b. Clarence Brandley
The Clarence Brandley case was quite different, for an extraor-
dinary amount of racial antagonism infused that case from start to
finish. Brandley's rape-strangulation murder conviction is the sub-
ject of a book aptly titled White Lies.93 The story is so extreme that it
would be deemed ridiculous were it fiction. Brandley was charged
with the murder of a sixteen-year-old white girl because, as the in-
vestigating officer said (using a racial epithet), he was the only Black
man who had the opportunity to commit the crime. 4 The sheriff's
department failed to investigate three other men who had an oppor-
tunity to commit the murder despite physical evidence that
suggested Brandley could not have been the killer" and despite vol-
unteered information that implicated one of the other men.9"
Brandley was convicted by the second juryw who apparently disbe-
lieved Brandley in favor of the state's white witnesses, despite
rampant inconsistencies and unexplained losses of evidence, includ-
ing the vaginal swabs that could have confirmed Brandley's
innocence.98 The jury's conduct, however, was the least extraordi-
nary aspect of the Brandley case. As a conservative reviewing judge
later found:
[T]he color of Clarence Brandley's skin was a substantial
factor which pervaded all aspects of the State's capital
prosecution against him, and was an impermissible factor
92. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (reviewing laboratory findings that white sub-
jects consistently displayed a significantly impaired other-race recognition ability,
and that some Black and Asian subjects displayed this impairment as well).
93. NICK DAVIES, WHrrE LIEs (1991).
94. See id. at 23.
95. See id. at 103-04.
96. See id. at 157-60.
97. The first jury hung because of one holdout juror, who described racially in-
flammatory remarks made by other jury members. See id. at 137-43.
98. See id. at 91-92.
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which significantly influenced the investigation, trial and
post-trial proceedings. The tone of the courtroom, as fos-
tered by the District Attorney's office, the judge and the
District Clerk's office, was white against Black .... The
authorities wholly ignored any evidence, or leads to evi-
dence, which might prove inconsistent with their
premature conclusion that Brandley had committed the
crime .... In the thirty years this court has presided over
matters in the judicial system, no case has presented a
more shocking scenario of the effects of racial prejudice,
perjured testimony, witness intimidation, an investigation
the outcome of which was predetermined, and public offi-
cials who for whatever motives lost sight of what is right
and just.9
It is possible to interpret the jury's verdict as simply an exten-
sion of this bad-faith prosecution. Davies' book suggests that this
explanation is not correct, or at least not complete; his interviews of
white people in the town (and of the juror who hung the first jury)
reveal citizens who had been convinced, albeit unreasonably, of
Brandley's guilt.
In Spite of Innocence'5' reports on a number of modem wrongful
capital convictions that appear to reflect racially biased credibility
determinations.'0 ' The book describes seven modem cases (in addi-
tion to the Brandley case) that involve Black defendants convicted in
the face of highly dubious evidence. °'5
99. Id. at 371-72.
100. RADELET ET AL., supra note 42.
101. One difference from the earlier cases that might strike the reader is that there
are no longer any cases described where a jury deems apparently consensual inter-
racial consensual sex to be rape. Little can be drawn from this difference, however,
because for almost all of this period, the Supreme Court prohibited capital convic-
tions based solely on a rape conviction. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(holding that the death sentence for rape is grossly disproportionate and is therefore
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment).
102. Anthony Brown was convicted in Florida in 1983 despite the fact that the
evidence against him was a co-defendant's testimony which the co-defendant later
recanted. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 42, at 289. Joseph Brown was convicted in
Florida in 1974 on the basis of testimony of a person who claimed to have had a mi-
nor role in the crime and who had been implicated by Brown when Brown turned
himself in on a robbery and implicated the prosecution's witness as his partner. See
id. at 290. Anthony Peek was convicted of murder in Florida in 1978 based solely on
the presence of his fingerprints on the victim's car despite his testimony that he had
discovered the abandoned car the day after the crime and had opened the door to
look inside and despite testimony of alibi witnesses that he was asleep at the home
where he lived at the time of the murder. See id. at 337. Allan Thrower was convicted
in Ohio in 1973 of murder in the ambush death of a police officer based solely on
eyewitness testimony of the officer's partner (later admitted to be false) despite
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The problem with focusing on these cases is that we have very
little insight into the thought processes of the jurors. Would the jury
have believed any police officer, regardless of race? Do jurors be-
lieve all eyewitness testimony, however weak or contradictory? The
information available on most of the wrongful convictions reported
by Radelet, Bedau and Putnam is often sketchy. Even in the higher
profile cases, where other detailed information is available, jurors
generally leave no record of their deliberations.
One source of insight into the decision-making process is the
arguments on race and credibility that advocates direct to the jurors,
to which I shall turn at the end of this section. Another source of in-
sight is the decisions of judges, who often leave more of a record
than do juries. When judges serve as the original fact finders, as they
do in bench trials, they usually give us no more insight into their
reasoning than do jurors. Judges also serve, however, as reviewers of
the newly discovered, wrongfully withheld, or incompetently over-
looked evidence said to justify the granting of a new trial. In that
role, a written opinion is often required, and more insight into the
decision-making process is consequently available. It is to two such
cases that I shall now turn.
It has taken me a long time get to these two cases, which are
really the heart of the article. So often it seems that the public-and
the civil side of the legal profession-have such revulsion for capital
cases that procedural wrongs in capital cases, unless coupled by un-
assailable proof of innocence, do not excite much interest. Neither of
these cases has unassailable proof of innocence. In Barry Lee
Fairchild's cases, there will always be doubt and his death in the
face of that unresolved doubt. In Ricky Drayton's case, it seems
quite likely that he had some involvement in the death with which
he was charged, but also, increasingly as time goes on, an equal
likelihood that his involvement did not rise to the level of murder. I
hope the reader will keep in mind the foregoing cases of established
innocence as she reads Fairchild's and Drayton's stories, and give
those stories the fair hearing they deserve.
Thrower's denials and testimony from alibi witnesses who claimed that Thrower
was in Detroit at the time of the killing. See id. at 348-49. Ray Giddens was convicted
of murder after an all white jury deliberated 15 minutes, based on the testimony of a
man who claimed to have accompanied him to the murder scene, despite the fact
that the testimony was deemed by an appellate court to be "replete with conflicts."
See id. at 30. Sammies Garrett was convicted of the murder of his white lover despite
her prior talk of suicide, the presence of an uncontested suicide note and only cir-
cumstantial evidence implicating Garrett. See id. at 306. Tony Cooks was convicted in
California in 1981 of the murder of a white man based on the testimony of a witness
who claimed she could later recognize him, although she had viewed him from an
apartment window 177 feet away, and the testimony of the victim's wife, whose first
identification of Cooks was uncertain even though his picture was the only one in
the photo array that matched the description she had given police. See id. at 190-92.
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2. Barry Lee Fairchild
a. The Facts
On February 26, 1983, an Arkansas state trooper chased a car
belonging to Marjorie Mason.'03 When the chase ended, two uniden-
tified Black men ran from the car.' 4 The next morning, Mason's
body was found near an abandoned farmhouse; she had been raped
and shot in the head.'5 A week later, Barry Lee Fairchild, a young
Black man with an IQ between 60 and 80,106 was arrested and shortly
thereafter questioned concerning the Mason killing. He confessed
involvement in the crime, along with the involvement of an acquain-
tance, Harold Green, whom he accused of unexpectedly shooting
Mason;0 8 Green was never charged. In the course of his confession
Fairchild identified an abduction site and admitted to stealing the
victim's watch, which he said he then sold to his sister.' °9
From his first meeting with his appointed trial counsel in 1983,
Fairchild maintained that his confession to the murder of Mason was
coerced."0 Fairchild moved to suppress his confession, alleging that
Sheriff Tommy Robinson and his chief assistant, Major Larry Dill,
repeatedly kicked him in the stomach, hit him in the chest and on
the arm with a shotgun, and threatened to kill him."' Videotapes of
Fairchild's confessions show him with a bandage around his head
and swollen eyes, but Sheriff Robinson and his deputies denied
beating Fairchild and claimed that the injuries were due to the attack
of a police dog during his arrest."12 The sheriff and his deputies also
represented that Fairchild had been the prime suspect at the time of
his arrest 13 and withheld the names of other suspects that had been
103. See Fairchild v. State, 681 S.W.2d 380, 381-82 (Ark. 1984).
104. See id. at 382.
105. See id.
106. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1434-35 (E.D. Ark. 1989), aff'd,
900 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1990).
107. See Fairchild, 681 S.W.2d at 382.
108. See Lynne Duke, In Arkansas, a Death Row Struggle and Doubt, WASH. POST,
Jan. 9, 1994, at Al, A22.
109. See id.
110. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 857 F.2d 1204, 1207 (8th Cir. 1988).
111. See id.
112. See Duke, supra note 108, at A22.
113. See id. As it later turned out, the sheriff's office also withheld evidence sug-
gesting that Mason was abducted far from the site which Fairchild's confession
identified as the abduction site and investigative notes that two of Mason's co-
workers recalled her wearing a shiny metallic watch on the day of the crime, not the
Black-banded watch Fairchild admitted taking and selling to his sister. I will not
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interrogated concerning the Mason murder, leaving Fairchild's alle-
gations of police brutality without support. The motion to suppress
the confession was denied, and Fairchild's statements were intro-
duced into evidence."' The jury convicted Fairchild of taking part in
the kidnapping, rape and murder of Mason, and sentenced him to
death."'
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Fairchild's conviction,
16
and a state court denied post-conviction relief." 7 Fairchild filed two
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, both of which were denied."8
After the dismissal of his third petition in August of 1990,119
Fairchild's attorneys fortuitously learned of an FBI probe of police
brutality in the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department. The report re-
vealed that Fairchild's brother, Robert Fairchild, had also been
picked up and subjected to a coercive interrogation in an effort to
get him to confess to the Mason murder. News of this report was
carried in the Little Rock press, and other Black men who had been
similarly treated by the sheriff and his deputies came forward. 20
Upon this new evidence, the Eighth Circuit stayed Fairchild's exe-
cution and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.''
The district court ordered access to the Pulaski County sheriff's
files,' 2 and it became clear that Fairchild had not been the prime
suspect as the sheriff's testimony had portrayed him, but rather one
in a group of fourteen Black men who made up a suspect list.123
Eventually, the thirteen other men were found."
At the evidentiary hearing, Fairchild's attorneys-Julius Cham-
bers, Richard Burr and Steven Hawkins of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund-presented a story of egregious police brutality.12
review all of that evidence here but instead will focus on the coerced confession
claim.
114. See Fairchild, 857 F.2d at 1205-06.
115. See Duke, supra note 108, at A22.
116. See Fairchild v. State, 681 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111.
(1985).
117. See Fairchild v. State, 690 S.W.2d 355 (Ark. 1985).
118. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 675 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Ark. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d
1204 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989); Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F.
Supp. 1429 (E.D. Ark. 1989), aff'd, 900 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1990).
119. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636, 638 (8th Cir. 1992).
120. See Jim Nichols, More Claim Beatings by Lawmen over Mason, ARK. GAZETTE,
Sept. 2, 1990, at A3.
121. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 912 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1990).
122. See Phoebe Wall Howard, Fairchild's Lawyer to Get Murder Files, ARK.
GAZETTE, Sept. 7, 1990, at Bi.
123. See Toyota Hill, At Least 14 Black Males on Mason List, ARK. GAZETrE, Sept. 8,
1990, at Bi.
124. See id.
125. See Phoebe Wall Howard, Fairchild Hearing for New Trial Begins, ARK.
GAZETrE, Sept. 8, 1990, at Al.
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Thirteen other suspects testified to the coercion to which they had
been subjected by the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department in the
course of the Mason murder investigation.'26 Each testified that he
had been picked up and accused of involvement in the Mason mur-
der. Eleven of the men were verbally threatened.)' Of the two who
were not verbally threatened, Donald Lewis was slapped, choked
and punched in the stomach,1' and Ezekiel Williams was slapped
and stomped upon. 3° Of those who were verbally threatened, one,
Nolan McCoy, was also threatened with a gun." Five more were
verbally threatened, threatened with guns and physically abused:
Randy Mitchell was beaten with clubs and fists through a telehone
book;"'32 Frank Webb was hit with two telephone books;' John
Walker was hit with a blackjack through a telephone book;TM Robert
Fairchild, the brother of Barry Lee Fairchild, was hit in the head with
a nightstick and kicked;'- and Frank King testified that the sheriff
had come into the room in which King was being interrogated and
said to his deputies, "You all ain't hit him yet?" after which King
was slapped so hard that he was forced out of his chair. Four of the
suspects testified that they were pressed to admit abducting and
raping Mason only and to blame a friend for the shooting, just as
Fairchild had done in his confession.37 In addition to the thirteen
Mason case suspects, two suspects from contemporaneous cases tes-
tified to brutal treatment by the Pulaski County Sheriff's office'38
Racial slurs were prominent in the course of these interrogations. 3
126. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Fairchild v. Lockhart, Civil No.




129. See id. at 128.
130. See id. at 355-56.
131. See id. at 156.
132. See id. at 184.
133. See id. at 204.
134. See id. at 247.
135. See id. at 44-45.
136. See id. at 270.
137. Randy Mitchell testified that the deputies wanted him to confess to a subor-
dinate role in the killing, with Nolan McCoy as the triggerman. See id. at 185. Nolan
McCoy testified that he and Mitchell were similarly teamed up as a suspect pair. See
id. at 157. Frankie Webb and McCoy were also linked as suspects, with Webb as the
triggerman. See id. at 205. Frank King and Michael Jackson were also matched. See id.
at 270.
138. Robert Johnson was, by his account, arrested in the mistaken belief that he
was Michael Johnson, a suspect in the case. See id. at 310. He testified that he was
kicked in the groin, causing stitches to be broken open from a recent circumcision
operation. See id. at 317. Earl Hightower testified to being accused on another case,
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A number of factors buttressed the truthfulness of this testi-
mony. First, each of the thirteen witnesses was confirmed to have
been considered as a suspect in the Mason murder case." For nine of
the thirteen men, this confirmation came from the state's own rec-
ords.' For the other four men, their status as suspects was
corroborated by strong and undisputed circumstantial evidence. 42
Second, shortly after their interrogations, seven of the men reported
to friends and relatives what had happened to them, and in each
case, as testified to by one or more witnesses to those contempora-
neous accounts, the details in those accounts matched the details
recounted by the suspects in their own testimony.'4 Third, for five of
the severely abused suspects, other persons observed physical mani-
festations of the abuse. " With respect to the two victims of police
brutality who had been suspects in other contemporaneous cases,
evidence of their injuries was documented by medical personnel.'41
Finally, in a number of cases, there were eyewitness accounts to
the abuse that corroborated the victim's accounts. Ronald Hender-
son testified that he heard someone being beaten, who finally said,
"O.K., I'll talk to you."'" Randy Mitchell testified that he had said
those words and was at the Criminal Investigation Division at the
being hit in the head with a phone book and being punched in the face, after which
he was hospitalized. See id. at 370-71.
139. See, e.g., id. at 128 ("N-, you're going to talk"); id. at 154 ("You black b-, go
back in the house"); id. at 204 ("N-, we know that you killed that nurse").
140. See id.
141. Five of the men were given Miranda warnings that informed each that he
was a "suspect in a capital murder," three more had hair samples taken from them
for the purpose of comparison to hair fragments found at the crime scene, and one
was referred to in a state crime lab memo as a suspect. See id.
142. One man was brought to the Criminal Investigation Division of the sheriff's
office on March 2 while two other suspects were still there. Another was questioned
due to his association with another established suspect. A third had his apartment
searched on March 4. When the search yielded clothing similar to that worn by the
men seen running from Mason's car, he and the fourth witness were taken to the
Criminal Investigation Division for questioning. See id.
143. See id.
144. One witness observed that Randy Mitchell's face was "puffed up" and that
his eyes were swollen and red, id. at 155, 202, and another reported that his face was
"very swollen and puffy," that he had "little knots" on his head, and that he was
"withdrawn for a while." See id. at 192. Another witness reported that when Robert
Fairchild returned from the sheriff's department, he was extremely upset and
clothed in a jail jumpsuit because he had "BM'd" and "wetted" in his clothes. See id.
at 98-99. John Walker's face was described as puffy and bruised. See id. at 251. Yet
another witness recalled that Frank King had been crying when he returned from the
sheriff's office and was so upset that it took him considerable time to calm down. See
id. at 284. Michael Johnson was observed to have had tears in his eyes when he first
recounted his abuse.
145. See id. at 322-27.
146. See id. at 241.
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same time as Henderson. Thelma Bradford testified that she was in
an interview on March 2nd and could hear Robert Fairchild being
abused, with officers saying, "f- him in his a-." 147 Ezekiel Williams,
Willie Washington, and Robert Fairchild were at the Criminal In-
vestigation Division at overlapping times. Williams heard someone
moaning in a room nearby.' Washington testified that Robert
Fairchild was presented to demonstrate the fate that awaited Wash-
ington if he were uncooperative. 149 Washington also overheard
Williams complaining about abuse." John Walker, Leon Williams,
Frank King and Michael Johnson were at the Criminal Investigation
Department at the same time. Walker overheard the frightened
voices and cries of King and Johnson."' Johnson heard the beating
and protests of King and later saw tears running down King's
cheeks. Williams heard Walker being struck and crying out and, at
about the same time, heard similar sounds from two other people.
Most surprising, Frank Gibson, a former deputy sheriff, testified that
he had participated in the abuse of Robert Fairchild.'52
In response to this barrage of evidence of police brutality in
connection with the Mason murder investigation, the state presented
the testimony of twelve officers who had been identified as the per-
sons abusing Fairchild and the other suspects. With respect to most
of the charged misconduct, the officers testified that they remem-
bered nothing about their contact with the suspects."' Where their
own records documented contact with the suspect, the officers did
not deny contact, but simply denied any recollection of that con-
tact.TM All of the officers denied engaging in threatening or abusive
behavior, and most denied witnessing or hearing of such behavior
by other officers.
Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele presided at the district court
hearing. At the conclusion of this testimony, Judge Eisele entered
extraordinarily extensive findings of fact, 133 pages of which were
made orally from the bench,' supplemented by 413 pages of written
findings.'M Judge Eisele found that only two of the fourteen suspects,
Randy Mitchell and Frank King, were abused by police officers in
147. See id. at 86.
148. See id. at 357.
149. See id. at 103-04.
150. See id. at 104.
151. See id. at 248.
152. See id. at 252.
153. See id. at 67-68.
154. See id.
155. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Fairchild v. Lockhart, Civil No.
PB-C-85-282 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Oral Findings].
156. See Written Findings.
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the course of the Mason murder investigation, and found that the
abuse in those two cases was not as severe as alleged . 7 With respect
to Robert Fairchild's allegations, Judge Eisele declared himself "a
hung jury, "'1 while wholly discrediting the other ten allegations of
abuse. He then concluded that there was a lack of evidence of the
kind of pattern of systematic abuse that might confirm that Barry
Fairchild's confession was coerced and reaffirmed his view that the
confession was voluntary."'
b. The Legal Claim
This opinion is deeply disturbing when viewed through the
lens of established equal protection doctrine. Assuming for the mo-
ment, as I shall expand upon in Part III, that equal protection law
applies to credibility determinations, it seems quite likely that the
judge engaged in unconstitutional race discrimination.
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., the Supreme
Court articulated a list of factors that may constitute prima facie
evidence of racially discriminatory intent, including, but not limited
to: a pattern of racially disparate impact, an historical sequence of
events which sheds light upon the decision maker's purposes, de-
viations from normal procedures, and contemporary statements by
the decision maker.' All of these factors are present in this case.
i. Disparate Impact
Essentially, the district court's determination of whether or not
Fairchild's confession was voluntary came down to a choice be-
tween the testimony of thirty Black witnesses (plus one white
witness, a former deputy sheriff) and the testimony of fourteen
white witnesses. At the remand hearing, thirty Black witnesses testi-
fied that officers of the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department verbally
and physically brutalized Black suspects during a murder investi-
gation.6 2 Fourteen white officers, in turn, denied these charges.'6
157. See id. at 199-203, 292-96.
158. See id. at 65, 79.
159. See id. at 150 (Donald Lewis); id. at 181 (Nolan McCoy); id. at 220 (Frankie
Webb); id. at 227-28 (Charles Pennington); id. at 240 (Michael Martindale); id. at 244-
45 (Ronald Henderson); id. at 259-69 (John Edward Walker); id. at 349-51 (Robert
Johnson); id. at 360-61 (Ezekiel Williams); id. at 372-74 (Earl Hightower).
160. See id. at 412-13.
161. 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1976).
162. See Oral Findings; Written Findings.
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The court found none of the Black petitioner's primary witnesses to
be entirely credible.'"
Disparate impact is apparent, however, not only in the judge's
ultimate conclusions, but also in his methods. The court made no
attempt to compare the entirety of each Black witness' testimony
with the entirety of each related witness' testimony. Instead, the
court discredited the entire testimony of several of Fairchild's Black
witnesses by seizing upon instances of discrepancies between a wit-
ness' testimony and his prehearing affidavit or another witness'
testimony about the same subject.' Of course, in the emotionally
charged circumstances presented by this case, some differences in
perceptions and memories might be expected, and testimony that
perfectly conformed might well be doubted.
More important than the correctness or incorrectness of this
wholesale disparagement based on minor inconsistencies is the
sharp contrast between the court's treatment of the minor inconsis-
tencies in the Black witnesses' testimony and its treatment of the
irreconcilable differences and blatant falsehoods present in the tes-
timony of white witnesses. For example, Sheriff Robinson testified in
the August 1990 hearing that Robert Fairchild was never brought in
as a suspect, but at the remand hearing in 1991, faced with substan-
tial contradictory evidence, Robinson suddenly recalled that Robert
Fairchild was the prime suspect. Major Dill, who was accused of
multiple incidents of misconduct, denied ever interrogating any
suspect, a denial that was contradicted by Sheriff Robinson and
called into question by Sergeant Beadle. Nevertheless, the court
questioned the credibility of neither Robinson nor Dill. Most dra-
matic, the judge chose to believe the vague and generalized
testimony of all of the state's witnesses that they did not abuse Barry
Fairchild, despite their numerous memory lapses and despite the
judge's own implicit findings that at least some of the officers had
lied in their denials of abusing some of Fairchild's witnesses.'" Such
evidence of disparate impact borders on the "stark pattern" evidence
163. See Oral Findings; Written Findings. Detective Frank Clark, who is Black,
also testified for the state on a very limited point. He testified that he did not re-
member being involved in the arrest of Nolan McCoy but would have remembered
the arrest had any racial epithets been used. See Written Findings at 176.
164. See Oral Findings; See Written Findings.
165. See, e.g., id. at 178 (comparing hearing testimony and affidavit of Nolan
McCoy and concluding that "[t]he oath obviously meant nothing to Mr. McCoy.").
166. Most of these witnesses claimed under oath that they had no recollection of
ever meeting, arresting, or interrogating Fairchild's witnesses. Their recollections
had to be refreshed by reference to the department's files. Notwithstanding the
judge's findings that some abuses had occurred, these white witnesses were unani-
mous in their assertions that they had never threatened or abused anyone during the
investigation of this murder. See id.
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sufficient to prove racial discrimination standing alone,6 7 but several
other aspects of the case contribute further to a prima facie showing
that the district court, in assessing the witnesses' credibility, dis-
criminated against Fairchild's witnesses on the basis of their race.
ii. The Historical Sequence of Events
The issue of race tainted the investigation, prosecution and ha-
beas corpus review of Fairchild's case from the outset. First, it must
be noted that this case involved a Black defendant charged with the
rape and murder of a white woman, which is particularly likely to
skew the impartiality of the judicial process, as many observers, in-
cluding members of the Supreme Court, have noted.' 6' Second, in
this case that greater likelihood had been realized, for it included
judicial findings that white police officers verbally and physically
abused Black suspects in a misguided attempt to secure a conviction.
As the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit noted, "the evidence also
unmistakably shows a current of racism in the Sheriff's Department of
1983. ''169 These abuses were compounded by the state's efforts to
dispose of this case quickly and to proceed with the execution in an
effort to conceal the state's numerous incidents of misconduct.
Moreover, the political aspects of this case were particularly
charged, as Sheriff Robinson, against whom the allegations of mis-
conduct were made, became Congressman Robinson and then ran
for Governor in the Republican gubernatorial primary.
' 70
iii. Deviations from Normal Procedures
Arlington Heights also lists deviations from normal procedures
as probative of intentional racial discrimination." Such departures
are clearly present in this case. Other than the district court judge's
repeated application of different standards in assessing the credibil-
ity of Black witnesses and white witnesses, it is impossible to
identify any consistent method in his findings of fact. Instead of as-
sessing all of the new evidence and testimony in accordance with the
Eighth Circuit's order to determine whether or not Fairchild's con-
fession was coerced, the judge first determined that the confession
167. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
168. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 332 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636, 643 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J., con-
curring).
170. See Cary Bradburn, TR Says He's Leader for '90s, ARK. GAzETTE, Oct. 15, 1990,
at Al.
171. 429 U.S. at 267.
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was not coerced and then avoided reconsideration of this conclusion
by discrediting all thirty of the Black witnesses. The truth of this as-
sertion is abundantly clear from the record, because the judge
relegated his assessment of the new evidence and testimony to a
document separate from and subsequent to the document in which
he presented his findings regarding Fairchild's allegations that his
confession was coerced.'
An examination of the means by which the judge then disposed
of Fairchild's Black witnesses reveals numerous other deviations
from ordinary procedures. Not only did the judge apply a far more
rigorous standard in assessing the credibility of Fairchild's Black
witnesses than in assessing the state's white witnesses, he even ap-
plied different and conflicting standards in discrediting the
testimony of the various Black witnesses. For example, at some
points the judge relied upon the fact that the abuse suffered by some
witnesses differed in its details from the abuse suffered by other
witnesses in order to discredit all of the witnesses' testimony; at
other times, the judge pointed to similarities in the testimony of
Fairchild's witnesses to imply that the witnesses were involved in a
conspiracy to testify falsely. Ultimately, he found that all witnesses
questioned during the Mason murder investigation who alleged that
they had been beaten in the same manner and by the same officers
as Fairchild were simply lying."
Although this shifting methodology did not permit the judge to
conclude that no abuse occurred, it did facilitate his rationalization
that Fairchild had shown no pattern of coercion. He found that two
witnesses may have been abused, but that they were not abused in
connection with the investigation of the Mason murder because they were
also being questioned in connection with other cases. Judge Eisele's
finding that two witnesses were abused in connection with the Ma-
son murder investigation did not shake his conviction that there was
no systematic coercion, for he relied on the fact that these two indi-
viduals were not abused in exactly the same manner as Fairchild
alleged he had been abused.
The judge found that six men, in order to conform their stories
to Fairchild's accounts of his own abuse, had fabricated testimony
that Sheriff Robinson, and his deputies had put guns to their heads.
The judge made this finding despite the lack of any evidence of a
conspiracy and without even considering the testimony of prior con-
sistent statements made by those who alleged that police officers
had put guns to their heads. The judge also managed to find some of
the brutality allegations made by two of the men to be true-while




discrediting their allegations that guns were used to threaten them.
Why? Perhaps because the gun-play testimony would have sup-
ported Fairchild's own account of his coercion and abuse. Similarly,
the judge found that the accounts of abuse with a telephone book,
abuse also recounted by Fairchild, were the product of a deliberate
attempt to conform testimony to the account by a former deputy
sheriff of such abuse-despite the fact there was no evidence that the
witnesses had exposure to the deputy's account and despite the fact
that one of the witnesses had been in Texas at the time the article
containing the former deputy's allegations had been published.
Other unusual procedures included a reference to the judge's
personal research on drug abuse to impeach a witness and the pur-
suit of an irrelevant distinction between witnesses who were
arrested and those who went voluntarily into custody. The judge
also failed to make any conclusion concerning whether Robert
Fairchild, Barry's brother, had been abused. Finally, Judge Eisele
also failed to come to a conclusion as to the identity of the officers
who participated in the abuse he did find. In fact, the judge did not
seem to consider whether his finding that some officers had partici-
pated in abuse against some suspects had any bearing upon the
credibility of the officers' denials of other alleged abuse.
iv. Contemporaneous Statements
Throughout the habeas proceeding, Judge Eisele made specific
comments and statements which reflected his condescending and
biased attitude towards Fairchild's Black witnesses. Particularly
pertinent to Fairchild's charge of racial discrimination is the fact that
Judge Eisele made completely unwarranted note of the race or eth-
nicity of several of Fairchild's witnesses. Of one he wrote, "Mr.
Henderson is a 30 year old Black man";174 of another, Ezekiel Wil-
liams, he commented, "He was born in Trinidad and speaks with an
accent."1 '
The judge referred to some of Fairchild's other witnesses in a
mocking, condescending manner. Of Randy Mitchell he said,
"Because of his fragile personality and poor and distorted memory,
it is likely that much of Mr. Mitchell's testimony in this area is inac-
curate or exaggerated,"1 76 and that "he appeared to be high strung,
impressionable and possessed of a faulty memory. He was abused
and mistreated but not to the extent-in manner or duration-to
174. Id. at 240.
175. Id. at 351.
176. Id. at 200.
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which he testified."'7 Similarly, of John Walker the judge wrote:
"[A]lithough Mr. Walker is not a fragile personality like Mr. Randy
Mitchell, there is some parallel between the testimony of these two
witnesses, perhaps because the reliability of their testimony is af-
fected by their respective addictions to drugs and alcohol during the
crucial time period."' ' Moreover, Judge Eisele also tended to make
irrelevant asides regarding the witnesses' general character. For ex-
ample, in discrediting Robert Johnson's testimony (supplemented by
photographic and medical evidence) that officers had kneed him in
the groin following his arrest, Judge Eisele remarked that Johnson
"is a large man who appears to be hot headed"' -as though this
could somehow justify the abuse in question. Similarly, beyond his
finding that Robert Fairchild "may have been threatened or
choked, ''lW Judge Eisele twice took the time to directly quote
Fairchild's misstatement that he took a "lie detester [sic]" test while
he was in the Sheriff's Office.'
Judge Eisele's description of John Walker reveals his penchant
for believing that Fairchild's Black witnesses were involved in some
sort of conspiracy, as when he remarked of Mr. Walker: "[He is]
somewhat of a salesman. He has a pleasant demeanor and manner
of talking. But he will go beyond the truth. He and his 'supporting'
witnesses had a clear objective of aiding petitioner in this high-
profile case."' 82 Although Judge Eisele made this assertion repeatedly
in his findings of fact and often used it to dismiss testimony that did
not accord with his own preconceptions, the assertion was never
supported by a single piece of evidence. With the possible exception
of Robert Fairchild, Barry Fairchild's brother, none of these wit-
nesses had any apparent motive to lie. The statute of limitations
barred any claims for damages. In the absence of evidence of such a
motive, this inference is both unusual and resonates with a racist
belief; Black citizens are more likely to lie for each other due simply
to their shared race.
All of these comments are reflective of Judge Eisele's ten-
dency to treat Fairchild's Black witnesses in a condescending and
biased manner that differed markedly from his treatment of the
state's white witnesses, who had obvious motives to lie.
Has the reader had enough? Would this not be a prima facie
case of discrimination in any other context? Of course, it remains
177. Id. at 203.
178. Id. at 265.
179. Id. at 350.
180. Id. at 65.
181. Id. at 42, 43.
182. Id. at 265.
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possible that Judge Eisele could have explained his disparate treat-
ment on nonracial grounds, but he was never asked to do so.
Fairchild's attorneys appealed, arguing that the district court judge's
fact-finding process was fundamentally defective in three ways, in-
cluding the use of different standards to determine the credibility of
the state's witnesses, but the Eighth Circuit did not bite. It simply
deferred to the district court's determination without addressing the
specific arguments raised by Fairchild.' 3 Tact had not worked. The
attorneys then petitioned for rehearing, suggesting rehearing en
banc. This time they argued that the errors below warranted the at-
tention of the full court, because, in other contexts, the district
court's errors would be viewed as evidence of race discrimination.
Making an analogy to Batson v. Kentucky, they argued that the panel
did not, but should have, considered whether the findings were in-
fluenced by race. The petition was denied."'
It was at this point that my own small role in this case began.
Steven Hawkins, one of the attorneys on the case, called me and
asked if I would be interested in working on parts of the petition for
certiorari. Along with two students, Joseph Kennedy and Linda
Slamon, I drafted three potential questions for the petition for certio-
rari. One of these became part of the petition, but the other two,
including an argument that the Court should grant certiorari to de-
cide whether a habeas corpus judge should be required to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his findings when the ha-
beas petitioner has established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in his assessment of witnesses' credibility, did not. It
was the judgment of the attorneys of record-a decision that I do not
question, not envying them in their choices-that the Supreme Court
might be more likely to grant certiorari (and, ultimately, relief) if the
facts supporting this race question were part of the petition, but the
question was not. The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari.
The end of the story is mostly tragic but also strange. Fairchild,
who until this point (and contrary to his attorneys' urgings) had
abjured an Enmund claim' that he could not be executed without
evidence that he had himself been aware of the risk that the victim
would be killed, changed his mind. He filed another habeas corpus
petition, again to the same district court judge, and was granted
183. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1992).
184. See Fairchild v. Lockhart, Nos. 90-2438EAPB & 91-2532EAPB, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33831 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 1992) (reh'g and reh'g en banc denied).
185. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prevents imposing
the death penalty without a jury finding that the defendant acted with "an intention
of participating in or facilitating a murder").
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relief.'" The judge found that Enmund barred his execution, 87 but the
Eighth Circuit reversed'm and Barry Lee Fairchild was executed by
the State of Arkansas on August 31, 1995.89
3. Leroy Joseph "Ricky" Drayton
a. The Facts
Ricky Drayton's story (or at least the race and credibility part of
it) is shorter, and as different from Barry Fairchild's as Clarence
Brandley's story is different from that of William Jackson. Discrimi-
nation, even by judges, comes in more than one form. Judge Eisele
was a federal judge with no apparent history of racial discrimina-
tion.'9' Moreover, his subsequent actions in declaring that the state
could not execute Fairchild suggest a lack of animosity toward
Fairchild. In contrast, the race and credibility issues in Ricky Dray-
ton's post-conviction proceedings are more old-fashioned.
Drayton, a Black man, was accused of the armed robbery, kid-
napping and murder of Rhonda Smith, a white convenience store
clerk who died of a single gunshot wound to the head and whose
body was found near an abandoned coal trestle.'9' There was no evi-
dence of sexual assault. The state argued that Ms. Smith's death had
been the result of an armed robbery with an execution-style gunshot
to the head.9'
Drayton was tried twice. 93 At both trials the state relied pri-
marily upon Drayton's statement, the testimony of an acquaintance
of Drayton's, Anthony Washington, and forensic evidence.'94
186. See Fairchild v. Norris, 869 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
187. See id.
188. See Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1994).
189. See Arkansas Executes Man Who Argued He Was Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1995, at A16.
190. As Fairchild's attorneys, we looked for evidence of Judge Eisele's racial dis-
crimination in published opinions and newspaper articles but found nothing.
191. See State v. Drayton, 361 S.E.2d 329,331-32 (S.C. 1987).
192. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing
and in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, appendix at 999-
1000, 1096-97, Drayton v. Evatt, Civ. Action No. 3:94-1608-OAJ, (D.S.C. filed May 23,
1994) [hereinafter Motion for Evidentiary Hearing].
193. Drayton's first conviction was reversed based on the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Drayton's state-
ment was freely and voluntarily given before it could consider the statement in
deliberations. See State v. Drayton, 337 S.E.2d 216 (S.C. 1985).
194. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, appendix. There were also statements
by witnesses who had seen the victim leave the convenience store, but these state-
ments did not suggest the use of force or a weapon. See id. at 679-717.
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Drayton maintained in both his statements that the shooting was an
accident.9 ' Washington, the state's immunized witness, reported
that Drayton told him the killing was an accident.' 96 Nevertheless,
this claim could not have been credible to the jury because Drayton's
trial counsel did nothing to investigate or argue the theory, and the
state put on a forensic expert who testified that the shooting could
not have occurred in the way Drayton claimed it had.
Drayton had told his counsel at the second trial, William Run-
yon, that he and Ms. Smith had been romantically involved,9 r but
Runyon ignored this information just as he ignored the possibility
that forensic evidence might demonstrate that the state's claim of an
execution-style shooting was false.' 98 This double failure to investi-
gate had appalling consequences. At a minimum, evidence of a prior
relationship could have negated the charges of kidnapping and rob-
bery, which the state argued were aggravating factors that justified
imposition of the death penalty. Moreover, such evidence of the
prior relationship, when combined with forensic evidence that the
killing could have occurred accidentally, might well have led a jury
to believe the story Drayton told police and to exonerate him of
murder.
Instead, Drayton was convicted.' 99 At the sentencing phase, trial
counsel again took no steps to challenge the state's case in
aggravation, nor did he present readily available mitigating
evidence about his client's mental state at the time of the offense or
about his adaptability to prison. The jury then sentenced Drayton to
death.m After the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction,' 1 Drayton's new lawyers sought relief in state post-
conviction proceedings, claiming that Drayton's attorney had failed
to provide him with effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt
and sentencing phases of his trial. 2
At the state post-conviction relief hearing, Drayton presented as
witnesses a number of friends, peers, and acquaintances, all of
whom were Black.2 Although these witnesses testified to many dif-
ferent events and perceptions, three consistent points, all central to
Drayton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, emerged from
195. See id. at 1155-56, 1561.
196. See id. at 2174-75.
197. See id. at 1442-43, 1478.
198. Such forensic evidence has now been adduced, as well as the evidence of a
prior relationship discussed below.
199. See Drayton, 361 S.E.2d at 331.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, appendix at 1671-85.
203. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.
SUMMER 19961
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
their testimony. First, Drayton knew Rhonda Smith, the victim; sec-
ond, Drayton was a chronic alcoholic; and third, Drayton was
intoxicated on the night of the offense.
Six African American witnesses testified that Drayton knew and
had an ongoing relationship with Rhonda Smith. They supplied de-
tailed and interlocking stories of this relationship. C'Ella Holmes, for
example, testified that she had known Ricky Drayton for seven or
eight years.2m According to Holmes, in either November or Decem-
ber of 1983 Drayton brought Smith to the house of a Jackie Cooper. 2°s
Holmes met Smith again on Drayton's birthday at a store near the
convenience store where Smith worked, at which time Drayton re-
ferred to Smith as his "bunny.'' 6
Another witness, Jacquelyn Cooper, testified that she saw Dray-
ton on a frequent basis. In fact, she described their relationship as
being like "a brother and sister."O Drayton spoke to her about
• 208
Smith. Once, when Cooper and Drayton rode their bikes together
to the convenience store at which Smith worked, Drayton mentioned
to Cooper that the woman in the store was the one about whom he
had been speaking.m About a week later, Drayton brought Smith
over to Cooper's house,210 and Smith eventually came to Cooper's
• 211
house a total of two or three times. On one occasion, Smith
brought her baby to Cooper's house and told Cooper that she and
Drayton were engaged and that Drayton was the father of her
baby.212 Drayton, however, told Cooper that Smith was a "connection
to get drugs.
'213
William Arthur Holmes recounted the first time that Drayton
met Smith, an account that is consistent with what Drayton had told
his trial counsel, Runyon, when describing his first encounter with
Smith. According to Holmes, Smith had come to Bonds Avenue to
buy a nickel bag of reefer.214 Drayton sold the marijuana, but "it
wasn't like the normal sell and go, this was like conversation that
took place within that time. 215 Soon, Smith was coming to buy
marijuana from Drayton, and eventually she began to stop by to see
204. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, appendix at 1187.
205. See id. at 1189.
206. See id. at 1189-90.
207. See id. at 1199.
208. See id. at 1201.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 1202.
212. See id. at 1205.
213. See id.




him socially.216 Holmes also testified that he had registered a room in
the local Howard Johnson's for Drayton and Smith because Drayton
did not have any identification.217 Holmes remembered that Drayton
had a black address book containing a telephone number of the con-
venience store that he kept in a blue safety box which an insurance
salesperson gave to him.218 According to Holmes, this book was
usually kept at Drayton's mother's house.219
Other witnesses further substantiated Drayton's relationship
with Smith. Petrannella Drayton, Drayton's sister, was available to
testify that on several occasions, she would call Smith for her
brother, because Drayton believed that it was best if another woman
asked for Smith. Petrannella Drayton would find Smith's tele-
phone number in a black book that Ricky Drayton kept in a locked
box at his mother's apartment.2' She remembered making these calls
for her brother in January and February of 1984.2 She also remem-
bered calling for Smith at least twice.m When she called, she would
ask for either Rhonda or "Ron."224
Sylvester Drayton, Ricky Drayton's brother, also recalled that
Ricky Drayton introduced him to Smith at the convenience store
some time after the Christmas holidays.2 Sylvester Drayton also
testified that he saw Smith several times on Bonds Avenue, which at
the time was considered a "reefer area," and that when she came
there, she asked for Ricky Drayton.m Like some of the other wit-
nesses, Sylvester Drayton recalled that his brother kept telephone
numbers in a black address book that he kept in a strong box at his
mother's house.2v
Elijah "Buffalo" Grant, a close friend of Ricky Drayton, remem-
bered that Drayton used to bring Smith to the Bonds Avenue area to
"show her off."m He first met Smith at the Murray Hill Apartments
216. See id. at 1217, 1219.
217. See id. at 1218-19.
218. See id. at 1221.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1268-69.
221. See id. at 1278.
222. See id. at 1278, 1281.
223. See id. at 1303.
224. See id. at 1290.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 1301.
228. See id. at 1339.
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on Bonds Avenue in the early part of 1984.2 9 On another occasion,
Grant went with Ricky Drayton to the convenience store.m
Conversely, the state presented only one witness who could
possibly have had-or who claimed to have-any first-hand knowl-
edge of the relationship between Ricky Drayton and Rhonda Smith.
That witness, Sandra Merritt, who is white, testified that she was a
friend of Smith and that she did not believe Smith knew Drayton.2 11
Although she claimed that Smith shared everything with her, it was
brought out during cross-examination that Merritt was unaware of
Smith's suicide attempt.22
Drayton's white trial counsel, William Runyon, also testified for
the state. Runyon admitted that Drayton had told him before trial
that he had known Smith; he recalled that Drayton had told him that
Smith had come into his neighborhood to buy marijuana, that he
had helped her avoid being ripped off, and that thereafter they were
friendly.m Runyon also recalled that Drayton had told him he had
seen Smith at a party. m Moreover, files that Runyon received from
Drayton's counsel at the first trial contained interviews with six wit-
nesses who had seen Drayton and Smith at the convenience store,
none of whom indicated that she seemed distressed, nervous or fear-
ful; two of these witnesses said that Smith and Drayton appeared to
be friends.us Also in Runyon's trial file were statements from two co-
workers declaring that Smith was a very safety-conscious person
who would not have opened the door to a stranger.26 Both of the co-
workers concluded that Smith must have been killed by someone
she knew and with whom she felt comfortable. Only two of these
eight witnesses were called by the state, and none were called by the
defense.
Runyon admitted that despite Drayton's claim that he knew
Smith and despite the eyewitnesses' perceptions, he performed no
investigation into the issue of a prior relationship. 8 He offered
229. See id. at 1339, 1341-42.
230. See id. at 1339. In addition to the testimony presented, Drayton also obtained
affidavits from Jerry Dixon and Charlton Green describing the romantic relationship
between Drayton and Smith.
231. See id. at 1421-22.
232. See id. at 1422, 1427-28.
233. See id. at 1442-43, 1478.
234. See id. at 1444.
235. See id.
236. See id. at appendix exhibits 5, 6.
237. See id. Also in the trial file was an FBI report that identified Drayton's fin-
gerprints on a Budweiser can found in the employee's restroom, which could only be
entered through a locked cashier's area. If Smith had not known Drayton, one would
expect her to have sent him to the public restroom.
238. See id. at 1478-79.
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several explanations for not pursuing this matter. First, Runyon
stated that he thought the evidence showed that Smith left the con-
venience store with someone she knew and trusted and that he
therefore did not want to prove that Drayton knew Smith.29 Instead,
he said, he had adopted the theory that "he didn't do it and make
them prove it."24° Runyon claimed that he had placed almost exclu-
sive reliance on suppressing the confession but offered no reason
why he did not pursue alternative theories, such as the relationship
between Smith and Drayton, which would not have been inconsis-
tent with suppression claims.24' He acknowledged that the state
could have tried Drayton even if the confession had been suppressed
on the basis of the testimony of Anthony Washington, the prosecu-
tion witness, and admitted that he really did not have a defense "in
the sense that we could place him somewhere else."2 Runyon also
said that he thought it would have been difficult to find witnesses to
the original drug transaction that had occurred two years earlier but
admitted that he had decided on his line of strategy even before
Drayton told him of his relationship with Smith.243
On the second and third questions, those of Drayton's alcohol-
ism and his intoxication on the night of Smith's death, C'Ella
Holmes testified that she had seen Drayton on that night, which was
Drayton's birthday, with beer in the back seat of his car and that she
had seen him drunk on several occasions.2" Jacquelyn Cooper testi-
fied that Drayton was very intoxicated on his birthday. 5 William
Holmes, one of Drayton's closest friends, testified that Drayton typi-
cally drank a case of beer a day and had drunk so heavily on his
birthday that he staggered when he walked.24 Petranella Drayton,
Ricky Drayton's sister, said that Drayton would consistently drink
when he finished working for the day, that she drank a case of beer
with Drayton on the day of the offense, and that she saw him intoxi-
cated that night.4 7 Ricky Drayton's brother Sylvester testified to his
brother's drug and alcohol abuse and stated that he drank with his
brother on his birthday.2" Finally, a clinical pharmacist, Dr. John
Voris, testified concerning the extent and effects of Drayton's long
prior history of alcohol and drug abuse based upon his interview
239. See id. at 1443, 1481.
240. See id. at 1448.
241. See id. at 1438, 1446, 1449-50, 1471-74.
242. See id. at 1448-49.
243. See id. at 1442, 1445.
244. See id. at 1190-91.
245. See id. at 1203.
246. See id. at 1215, 1224.
247. See id. at 1268, 1270-71.
248. See id. at 1286-87, 1294.
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with Drayton and the affidavits and testimony presented at the post-
conviction relief hearing.249 The state offered no evidence on this
matter.
The state post-conviction judge, Walter J. Bristow, responded to
this evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel in a drastic way: he
found the claims of a prior relationship, the claims of Drayton's
chronic alcoholism, and the claim of Drayton's intoxication on the
night of the offense all to be untrue. It was then easy for Judge Bris-
tow to conclude that Drayton was not denied the effective assistance
of counsel by Runyon's failure to pursue matters which did not ex-
ist. Examining Judge Bristow's decision under the framework of
Arlington Heights leaves virtually no room for doubt that race
skewed his credibility determinations.
b. The Legal Claim
i. Disparate Impact
Judge Bristow rejected every part of every Black witness' testimony.
He also rejected expert testimony that was predicated on the accu-
racy of African Americans' testimony concerning Drayton's
alcoholism, intoxication, and prior relationship with Rhonda Smith.
In contrast, he accepted all of the testimony of the state's white witnesses.
He painstakingly criticized the testimony of Black witnesses but
declined to extend the same scrutiny to the testimony of white wit-
nesses. Thus, the record in this case shows a grossly disparate
impact against the Black claimant and his Black witnesses.
Six African American witnesses testified to Drayton's ongoing
relationship with the victim, and Drayton's white trial counsel testi-
fied that Drayton said before trial that he knew Smith. Although
Judge Bristow acknowledged trial counsel's testimony of this pre-
trial statement to be true, he nevertheless completely rejected all of
the testimony of Drayton's Black witnesses that such a relationship
in fact existed with the abrupt generalization: "I do not find this tes-
timony to be credible."'2'
As in the Fairchild case, not only the results, but the methods as
well, of the judge's credibility assessments are racially disparate.
249. See id. at 1361.
250. See id. at 2085.
251. Id. at 2091. In the proceedings in state court, the state went so far as to accuse
post-conviction counsel of knowingly offering false evidence and suborning perjury
by placing Black witnesses on the stand to testify regarding the relationship between
Drayton and Smith. In the face of this unusual attack, Drayton's counsel subse-
quently produced polygraphs of witnesses that further bolstered their truthfulness.
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Judge Bristow discredited the Black witnesses' testimony in a vari-
ety of ways, noting, for example, some witnesses' failure to
remember exact dates and to recall some physical features of the
victim. These criticisms did not take into account the five-year time
lapse between the events and the testimony and stood in sharp con-
trast to Judge Bristow's treatment of the state's white witnesses'
similarly vague and generalized testimony.
Although Sandra Merritt, a white prosecution witness, testified
that she and Rhonda Smith talked about everything, cross-
examination revealed that she was unaware of important and per-
sonal aspects of the victim's life. 2 That these discrepancies might
cast doubt on either the truthfulness or the accuracy of her assertions
concerning the absence of a relationship between Smith and Drayton
(i.e., that the testimony of a white witness concerning the existence of
an interracial relationship might be wrong) did not seem to occur to
Judge Bristow.
The post-conviction judge was also surprisingly gullible in ac-
cepting, at face value, trial counsel's explanation for his failure to
investigate the relationship of which his client had informed him.
Evidence of a relationship between Drayton and Smith would have
cast doubt on the aggravating circumstances of kidnapping and
armed robbery. Furthermore, such evidence was consistent with the
state's evidence presented at trial and would in no way have con-
flicted with the defense that Drayton's trial counsel claimed to have
been pursuing. Nevertheless, Drayton's counsel's patently illogical
explanation for his failure was never probed; Judge Bristow appears
not to have considered the possibility that the counsel's own predis-
positions led him to reject prematurely the possibility of a
relationship between the Black defendant and the white victim, de-
spite the fact that the existence of such a relationship would have
been enormously helpful to Drayton's case.
Judge Bristow was no more evenhanded in his evaluation of the
testimony presented by Drayton concerning his intoxication and al-
coholism. Four Black witnesses testified to Drayton's long-term
alcohol abuse and five Black witnesses testified to his drinking on
the day or night of the offense.m Judge Bristow rejected all testi-
mony of Drayton's alcohol abuse and intoxication on the night of the
offense,2 despite Drayton's own statement (admitted over his ob-
jection at trial) that he had been drinking at a party earlier in the
evening and had consumed one or more beers at the convenience
252. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 244 to 248 and accompanying text.
254. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, appendix at 2097.
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storez  and despite the fact that testimony of Drayton's alcoholism
and intoxication was unrefuted. Judge Bristow simply summarily
dismissed these claims2 6
Thus, Judge Bristow discredited the testimony of every one of
Drayton's six Black witnesses. He also summarily dismissed expert
testimony that relied on accounts given by the Black defendant and
his Black witnesses. 7 Moreover, Judge Bristow failed to scrutinize
the testimony of the state's white witness concerning the existence of
a prior relationship and gave great deference to the white trial coun-
sel's for not investigating and presenting evidence favorable to
Drayton. In contrast, his order clearly implies that every one of
Drayton's Black witnesses lied about every single event to which
they testified. Such evidence of disparate impact, while perhaps not
rising to the level of the "stark pattern" evidence that, standing alone
is sufficient to prove intentional racial discrimination, 2 8 nevertheless
is strong evidence of racial discrimination29 This case provides two
additional reasons to infer intentional racial discrimination: devia-
tions from normal procedure and the historical sequence of events.
ii. Deviations from Normal Procedures
Arlington Heights lists deviations from normal procedures as
another factor probative of intentional discrimination. ° Judge Bris-
tow's credibility determinations present not one, but at least three
such departures from ordinary practice. First, as discussed above, in
resolving conflicting testimony on the issue of the existence of a
prior relationship, Judge Bristow applied different standards to
Drayton's Black witnesses than he applied to the state's white wit-
nesses.
255. See id. at 1149. Drayton's statement is in part corroborated by the FBI's report
that identified Drayton's fingerprints on a beer can found at the convenience store.
256. See id. at 2097.
257. In addition to the expert testimony concerning Drayton's history of alcohol-
ism and his intoxication on the night of the offense, Drayton also presented three
experts who testified concerning his adaptability to prison. These experts were
white, but their testimony relied on interviews with and evaluations of Drayton. See
id. at 2097. The state presented one white witness who testified to minimal conduct
violations that had occurred during Drayton's earlier incarceration and work release.
Judge Bristow focused on the minor conduct violations, presented by the state's non-
expert white witness, and disregarded the value of the testimony of Drayton's expert
witnesses. See id. at 2074-78.
258. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
259. See id. at 266.
260. See id. at 267.
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Second, on the issues of Drayton's history of alcoholism and his
intoxication on the night of the offense, Judge Bristow disbelieved
testimony from close friends and experts and relied instead upon the
absence of testimony concerning Drayton's alcohol and drug abuse in
the two previous trials to discredit those witnesses. 6 This procedure
for weighing evidence was extremely unusual for two reasons. Most
strikingly, there was no contradiction between the trial testimony
and the post-conviction testimony. That is, none of the witnesses
whose testimony the judge relied upon actually stated that Drayton
did not have a problem with alcohol; they simply did not state that
he did.2 2 Moreover, even if these "omissions" permitted some very
weak inference that the trial witnesses were unaware of a drug or
alcohol problem, the trial testimony came from obviously inferior
sources. The trial witnesses relied upon by Judge Bristow had only
casual contact or somewhat formal relationships with Drayton and
were therefore not intimately acquainted with his personal habits. In
contrast, those who testified to Drayton's problems with alcohol at
the post-conviction relief hearing were neighbors, relatives, and
friends-persons whom one would ordinarily expect to have far bet-
ter information about a person's problematic use of alcohol and
drugs.
A third deviation from ordinary procedures lies in the fact that
Judge Bristow disbelieved every one of Drayton's Black witnesses
and yet failed to articulate a compelling motive for this wholesale
lying. The final order's failure to address this issue suggests that
Judge Bristow may have believed an argument occasionally made
explicitly by prosecutors but rightly condemned by courts:26 that
African Americans are likely to be lying when they testify for each
other.
iii. The Historical Sequence of Events
If the disparate impact and the deviations from ordinary proce-
dures leave any doubt that Judge Bristow's credibility
determinations were influenced by race, the history of his legislative
career and private life eliminate that doubt. Judge Bristow's legisla-
tive career evinces long-standing and consistent support for
261. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, appendix at 2095-97.
262. In Drayton's two trials, several witnesses said they had seen him drinking.
One witness said that she had not seen Drayton drunk. See id. at 1918-19. The other
witnesses were not specifically questioned about his drinking habits. That counsel
failed to pursue inquiry into his client's alcohol and drug abuse, however, hardly
proves that there was none.
263. See infra Part mI.A.1.b.
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blatantly racially discriminatory public policies.2" In 1960, Judge
Bristow was a supporter of a resolution that commended the eight-
een United States Senators from the South on "their courageous
stand in opposing the proposed Civil rights Legislation pending in
the United States Senate" and described federal civil rights legisla-
tion as an "iniquitous program.
'4
In 1964, Judge Bristow attempted to kill, by raising a point of
order, consideration of a bill to authorize the purchase of adjoining
property at South Carolina State College, a predominately Black in-
stitution, to pay off notes on the college.2" He also argued in favor of
a later attempt to kill the bill.267 In contrast to his lack of support for
traditionally Black institutions, Judge Bristow supported institutions
that cherished the Confederacy; in 1957 he supported a bill to
authorize the South Carolina Archives Commission to acquire a site
and erect an archives building to house the archives and confederate
relics of the state.2" In 1967, he supported a resolution in favor of a
paid state holiday on January 19th, Robert E. Lee's birthday.2 69
Judge Bristow served on the South Carolina Senate Penitentiary
Committee from 1961 to 1975, serving as chair of the committee from
1965 to 1975;m until 1972 South Carolina law prohibited integration
of prisoners on work farms or chain gangs.2 He also served on the
Education Committee from 1965 until he retired as a state senator,
V 2
a period during which the Committee took a number of actions to
thwart school desegregation. For example, in 1965, Judge Bristow
proposed a bill that would have granted certain students permission
to attend school districts in which they did not live.m In 1971, Bris-
tow proposed an amendment to the South Carolina Constitution
that would have permitted the use of public funds to aid resident
students attending sectarian schools of higher education.274 The
264. See infra notes 265 to 277 and accompanying text.
265. 93rd General Assembly, 2d Sess., 1960 J. SENATE S.C. at 568.
266. See Applicant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, No. 88-CP-10-2441,
appendix at 1753 (Charleston County Ct. Common Pleas June 10, 1991).
267. See id.
268. See H. 1053, 92nd General Assembly, 1st Sess., 1957 J. HOUSE REPRESEN-
TATIVES S.C. 104.
269. See S.48, J. SENATE 95 (Jan. 17, 1967).
270. See Applicant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, appendix at 1750.
271. See Act of June 23, 1972, No. 1433, sec. 55, 1972 GENERAL AND PERMANENT
LAWS OF S.C. 2629 (overturning requirement that prison chain gangs be separated by
race).
272. See Applicant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, appendix at 1750.
273. See S. 127, J. SENATE S.C. 366 (Feb. 16, 1965); id. at 1045 (May 12, 1965).
274. See S. 295, J. SENATE S.C. 868 (Mar. 17, 1971); id. at 923 (Mar. 25, 1971).
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Education Committee did not introduce any anti-discrimination
legislation until 1970.2
Judge Bristow's private memberships continue to evince a pref-
erence for segregation. He is and has been a member of several
racially discriminatory white clubs, including the Forest Lake Coun-
try Club, the Cotillion Club, and the Palmetto Club.
None of these facts were disputed by Judge Bristow when he
denied Drayton's motion to recuse himself. At that time Drayton
also alleged that in 1962 Judge Bristow supported legislation which
would have required that all human blood used for blood transfu-
sions be labeled according to the race of the donor, and made it a
misdemeanor, in the absence of an emergency, to fail to notify re-
cipients of blood that they were receiving blood from a person of
another race.7 6 Judge Bristow denied this allegation and asserted
that he had opposed and filibustered legislation concerning blood
transfusion identification. This denial was something less than the
full truth. Although Judge Bristow may have opposed legislation
that would have criminalized failure to notify blood transfusion re-
cipients of the race of the donor, he nevertheless proposed a bill that
would have required the classification and labeling of blood by
race.
Given Judge Bristow's personal history, it is difficult to retain
any doubt that his credibility determination in the Drayton case was
racially biased. Since Bristow's rejection of Drayton's post-
conviction review claim, Drayton's attorneys-of whom I have be-
come one-have filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district
court" and a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the petition.279
Unlike the Fairchild case, where there was no established doctrinal
peg on which to hang a claim of biased adjudication of credibility,
the credibility determination in the Drayton case, because it oc-
curred in state court, had a statutory structure for raising this issue.
Under the version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) which governed at the
time Drayton's petition was filed, the findings of a state court trier of
275. See Applicant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, memorandum at
1750.
276. See id.
277. Bristow's bill read: "All human blood hereafter collected in the State of
South Carolina for transfusions shall be clearly labeled so as to indicate the race of
the donor by number as follows:(1) Caucasian;(2) Negroes;(3) Mongoloid; (4) Races
other than Caucasian, Negroid, or Mongoloid." H. 1080, J. SENATE S.C. 911, 941-42
(Mar. 28, 1962).
278. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, Drayton v.
Evatt, Civ. Action No. 3:94-1608-OAJ (D.S.C. filed May 23, 1994).
279. Applicant's Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, Drayton v. Evatt, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 3:94-1608-OAJ (D.S.C. filed May 23, 1994).
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fact are presumed to be correct in a federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing, if and only if the state court has, after a full and fair hearing,
reliably found the relevant facts.2w Where the state hearing was not
"full and fair," however, a federal hearing on the controverted fac-
tual questions is mandatory.2' Moreover, "[tihe claim that the court
has discriminated on the basis of race in a given case brings the in-
tegrity of the judicial system into direct question" and provides a
particularly compelling justification for extending federal habeas
282
corpus review. We have argued that Drayton's state court hearing
was rendered egregiously unfair by the post-conviction judge's ra-
cial discrimination against Black witnesses and by the judge's
refusal to recuse himself in the face of strong evidence of his bias
and that the statute (as well as the U.S. Constitution) therefore re-
quired a new evidentiary hearing.m
The magistrate assigned to the case, Robert Carr, issued a re-
port and recommendation concluding that Drayton's petition for
habeas corpus relief, as well as his motion for an evidentiary hear-
ing, should be denied.2 Carr's report never discussed any of the
reasons Drayton claimed he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his constitutional claim, including the allegation that the state fact
finder was racially biased.m Instead, the report proceeded to dispose
of each of Drayton's substantive claims by declaring that Judge Bris-
tow's findings of fact "are binding on this court,"2 completely
ignoring the allegations that the hearing had been rendered unfair
by virtue of racial bias.
We have objected to the report and recommendation, and there
the case stands.
4. Other Modem Examples
The Drayton and Fairchild cases are more helpful to race and
credibility issues than are the high profile/subsequent exoneration
cases because their details make the inference of a racially influenced
credibility determination stronger. But even taken together, the
280. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105, repealed by Act of
Apr. 24, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218. See infra Part II.C.1 for a brief dis-
cussion of the implications of the recent revisions in the federal habeas statute for
claims alleging racially biased credibility determinations.
281. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981).
282. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979).
283. See Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.
284. See Report and Recommendation, Drayton v. Evatt, Civ. Action No. 3:94-





exoneration cases and the two habeas cases just reviewed cannot tell
us much about the frequency with which such issues arise. One
might be confident from these cases that there are others out there,
but how many are there? I cannot make an estimate, but several
other sources suggest that racially biased credibility determinations
are not rare.
a. Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases
Prosecutorial misconduct cases are one such source. In at least
six modern cases, prosecutors have argued that a witness' race27 or
ethnicitym made him less likely to be truthful. Most egregiously, one
prosecutor "told the jury, in effect, that the testimony of the defen-
dant should not be believed because the defendant was from Haiti
where if you told the authorities the truth, you were dead."M In an-
other four cases, prosecutors argued that a defense witness was
more likely to be lying because he was testifying for another person
of his race.29° In the most extended such argument, the prosecutor
argued that all of the defendant's alibi witnesses were his "black
brothers and sisters," asked rhetorically how often one saw African
Americans greeting each other with "hey brother, hi, ya sister," and
then asked the jurors to consider what bias would be inherent in the
fact that the defendant's witnesses were Black.91 In four cases, a
prosecutor argued that an African American prosecution witness'
testimony was more credible because he or she was testifying
against another African American. 9' In one case a white alibi wit-
287. See Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1979) (reviewing case
in which prosecutor argued "Not one White witness has been produced in this case
that contradicts [the White prosecution] witness' testimony."); Smith v. State, 516
N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Ind. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988) (reviewing case in
which prosecutor, among other racial comments, characterized the testimony of an
African American witness as "shucking and jiving on the stand"); People v. Richard-
son, 516 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1977) (reviewing case in which prosecutor referred to Black
defendant and his Black witnesses as "street people" and said "they lie every day").
288. See George v. State, 539 So.2d 21 (Fla. App. Ct. 1989); Stanton v. State, 349
So.2d 761, 764 n. 1 (Fl. Dist. App. 1977) (reviewing case in which prosecutor asked
defendant, "Isn't it true in gypsy practice that it is okay to lie and cheat and steal if
you can get away with it?"); State v. Kamel, 466 N.E.2d 869, 866 (Ohio 1984)
(reviewing case in which prosecutor argued that defense witnesses were unreliable
by reason of their foreign birth in the Mideast).
289. See George, 539 So.2d at 21.
290. See State v. Thompson, 654 P.2d 453 (Kan. 1982); Richardson, 363 N.E.2d at
926; People v. Kong, 517 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (App. Div. 1987); Kamel, 466 N.E.2d at 866
(reviewing case in which prosecutor argued that defense witnesses, natives of Syria,
were unduly biased because they were the defendant's "countryman").
291. See Thompson, 654 P.2d at 457.
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ness' testimony for the Black defendant was argued to be less credi-
ble because, as a white woman living with a Black man, she had
faced social disapproval and would therefore be more willing to
lie.2
In a number of other cases, supposed racial propensities were
called on to bolster the credibility of white witnesses. Four prosecu-
tors argued that a white rape complainant should be believed when
she denied consent because, to use one prosecutor's phrase, "the av-
erage white woman abhors anything of [a sexual] nature that had to
do with a Black man."29 4 In another case, the prosecutor argued that
the white male witness must be telling the truth about his accusa-
tions, because his story included admitting to sexual intercourse
with a Black woman, and "[ilf he is going to lie about anything else,
he wouldn't admit having intercourse with a black woman. 295 In yet
another case, a prosecutor, in order to impeach the veracity of the
defendant's claim that at the time of his arrest he believed plain-
clothed police officers were muggers, repeatedly argued that the
African American defendant could not have believed that white men
296
were muggers.
Thus far I have considered cases where prosecutors argued that
the race of a witness was in some way connected to his or her will-
ingness to tell the truth. But credibility has components of accuracy
as well as honesty. It is relatively uncommon for a prosecutor to di-
rectly portray a person as less intelligent because of his or her race.
292. See McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Bramlett,
569 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (IM. App. Ct.), lv. app. denied, 580 N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1991); People
v. Ali, 551 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (App. Div.), Iv. app. denied, 559 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. 1990);
People v. Green, 453 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (App. Div. 1982).
293. See State v. Terry, 582 S.W.2d 337,339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
294. Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Reynolds
v. State, 580 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reviewing case in which prose-
cutor commented that an "articulate" and "attractive" white woman would not have
consented to sex with Black defendant); State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989)
(reviewing case involving similar argument by prosecutor); State v. Bautista, 514
P.2d 530, 532-533 (Utah 1973) (same); see also Commonwealth v. Morgan, 401 A.2d
1182, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (argument that white girl would not have patronized
Black bar).
295. See People v. Richardson, 363 N.E.2d 924, 926 (111. App. Ct. 1977).
296. People v. Thomas, 514 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92-93 (App. Div. 1987). See also People v.
Traylor, 487 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (argument by prosecution that
police officers' behavior could be explained by the fact that they were white police
officers in a Black neighborhood).
297. But see People v. Turner, 367 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (II. App. Ct. 1977) ("Sorry, if
I used such big words with [the African American eyewitness] like 'spectator' to
'Blacky tromp Whitey.' Those are awfully big words I know .... "); Smith v. State,
516 N.E.2d 1955, 1064 (Ind. 1987) (prosecutor, amid other racial remarks, described a
Black co-defendant as "stuck by his own stupidity"); United States ex rel. Haines v.
McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor made remarks about
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However, a variety of other racially demeaning remarks, such as
racial epithets,29 animal imagery,29 and the practice of referring to a
minority race witness by her first name,3 may also serve to call up
racial stereotypes about intelligence.
For several reasons the reported cases underestimate the
prevalence of prosecutorial arguments that link race and credibility.
First, the number of appeals that raise any form of inflammatory
argument claim cannot be accurately ascertained because of the
common practice of affirming criminal convictions without
opinions. Second, in a number of inflammatory argument cases, the
court's opinion refers in generic terms to racial comments or
inflammatory remarks without describing them; sometimes it is only
the happenstance of a dissent that informs the reader as to the
content of the comments.301 Third, courts do not always reverse even
blatant cases of prosecutorial abuse and almost never reverse more
subtle race-biased arguments,' thereby diminishing the incentive to
litigate less extreme misconduct. Moreover, prosecutorial arguments
are only half of the story. Defense counsel also may ask questions
and make arguments premised on racially influenced views of
"colored people," including that they did not know and could not do things that are
"commonplace for the ordinary person").
298. The use of such epithets is not entirely a thing of the past. See Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1739, 1754 (1993).
299. The Rodney King beating trial included many such images, including "Hulk-
like strength," "bear-like yell," "wounded animal," and "Gorillas in the Mist." See
Reporter's Notebook: Baton is 'Star' in Police-Beating Trial, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1992 at
A14. For another egregious recent example, see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601
(Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (prosecutor, in case involving alleged assault by Black defen-
dant of white female victim, referred to movie that mentioned gorillas in its title and
in which young white woman stood alone against African hunters who eventually
murdered her). See generally Johnson, supra note 298, at 1753-54 (reviewing other
cases of animal and subhuman imagery).
300. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (per curiam) (reviewing case
based on facts reported in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 248 n.4 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed on a
Black witness who refused to answer when a lawyer insisted on calling her by her
first name. Such cases still occur. The Rodney King beating case provides an example
of a witness using a Black adult's first name. One of my clients was referred to by the
prosecutor in the course of an extremely inflammatory summation as "Pedro." See
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16, People v. Arroyo, 431 N.E.2d 271 (N.Y. App.
Div. Jan. 22, 1981). See also State v. Torres, 554 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)
(noting that prosecutor repeatedly referred to defendants as Mexicans or Mexican
Americans while referring to the complaining witness with title "Ms." or "Mrs.").
301. Compare the majority view in Soap v. Carter, 632 F.2d 872, 876, (10th Cir.
1980), characterizing appellant's brief as one that "emphasize[d], out of all propor-
tion, a minor incident," with the dissent's description of a prosecutor's argument
that when Indians drink, they often cannot handle it, and that Indians, as "a class of
people," do not live in a decent way ... without violence," id. at 878 (Seymour J.,
dissenting).
302. See infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
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credibility, but because prosecutors may not appeal acquittals, there
is usually no record of defense counsel's misconduct.
The underlying question is not, however, the prevalence of this
specific form of attorney misconduct, but rather the influence of race
on credibility determinations. Reported cases involving prosecuto-
rial race and credibility arguments are therefore useful both for
extrapolating the frequency with which jurors have been prompted
to think about credibility in racial terms and for inferring something
about the predispositions of jurors to do so. A prosecutor is unlikely
to make an argument that he or she does not think will resonate
with jurors' own thinking processes; it is no accident that we do not
see cases urging jurors to discount the witnesses' testimony because
they are "Americans." The persistence of these arguments suggests
that at least a number of prosecutors believe jurors will find them
persuasive.
b. Juror Accounts
There is very little direct evidence concerning the frequency
with which jurors consider race in assessing credibility. This is in
part due to the prevailing rules against juror impeachment of ver-
dicts.3°3 Courts that do permit impeachment based on racial bias
occasionally hear stories of overt discussion of race and credibility.
Thus, in one reversed burglary prosecution, the jury foreman said,
"You can't tell one black from another," and a second juror argued
that the jury should take the word of the white victims over that of
the Black defendant. In a 1995 civil case that subsequently was re-
versed, jurors made a variety of appallingly racially biased remarks,
including references to one Black witness as being like a chimpan-
zee.3 Cases where courts refuse to consider such testimony are
more common, but occasionally they too generate reports of remarks
relating to race and credibility. Moreover, on occasion jurors
complain to the judge during the course of deliberations about the
303. See infra note 363 and accompanying text.
304. Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D.NoY. 1979).
305. See Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 335 n.2 (Fla. 1995). My grati-
tude goes to Professor Judith Resnick for alerting me to this case.
306. See, e.g., Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 484, 488 (S.D. Iowa 1978), aff'd, 577
F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978) (reviewing case in which
juror strutted like a minstrel and mimicked Black dialect where defendant and his
attorney were Black). Jurors sometimes report similar behavior by other jurors to the
media. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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biased conduct of fellow jurors; here too, improper race and credibil-
ity arguments are sometimes involved. 2n
All courts are in agreement, however, that the unstated biases of
a juror may not be used to impeach a verdict,"8 so most of the infor-
mation about internal juror reasoning about race and credibility
must come from nonlegal sources. I will turn to those sources in a
moment but first pause to describe two Supreme Court opinions that
clearly include race and credibility inferences. The first case involves
a race and accuracy inference, the second a race and truthfulness
inference.
c. Supreme Court References
i. Manson v. Brathwaite
In Manson v. Brathwaite,"9 the defendant was charged with the
sale of narcotics.10 His conviction depended upon the identification
testimony of an undercover officer, an identification that the
defendant argued was the product of an unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure.31' The undercover officer, who did not
know the seller, left the sale and drove to headquarters, where he
described the seller to another officer as " 'a colored man, approx-
imately five feet eleven inches tall, dark complexion, black hair,
short Afro style, and having high cheekbones and of heavy build.'
1,312 The other officer, without further information, suspected
Brathwaite, obtained a photo of Brathwaite and left it for the
undercover officer to view. With no other photos to choose from, the
undercover officer identified Brathwaite as the seller, an
identification that he repeated at trial and in which he expressed
complete confidence.313
307. See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1986) (reviewing
case in which juror made racial and religious slurs and comments on the number of
Jewish witnesses testifying for Jewish defendants).
308. See, e.g., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562,581 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that letter
revealing juror's speculation about motivations of plaintiff's attorney did not present
any extrinsic material placed before the jury); cf. Tobias, 468 F. Supp. at 1291 (holding
that juror's affidavit of prejudicial statements made to other jurors should be re-
viewed, because it raised question of whether jury's verdict was tainted by improper
extrinsic influences); Powell, 652 So. 2d at 357 (holding that only inquiry into objec-
tive acts committed by or in the presence of the jury or a juror is permissible).
309. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
310. See id. at 101-102.
311. See id. at 103.
312. See id. at 101.
313. See id. at 102.
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The Second Circuit eventually reversed Brathwaite's conviction
on the grounds that the photo identification should have been sup-
pressed as unnecessarily suggestive.314 That court opined that a risk
of irreparable misidentification was present, referring, among other
things, to the poor lighting of the incident, the officer's motive to
make arrests, and the fact that his description "could have applied to
hundreds of Hartford black males."315 The Supreme Court reversed
the Second Circuit, agreeing that the identification proceeding was
unnecessarily suggestive,"' but disagreeing as to the risk of irrepa-
rable misidentification."' The Court found that a number of factors
enhanced the reliability of the identification, including the fact that
"[the undercover officer] himself was a Negro, and was unlikely to
perceive only general features of 'hundreds of Hartford black
males.' ,,31
The Court did not discuss this assertion. In context, it appears
that the Court was claiming that the Black officer was more likely,
because of his race, to make an accurate identification. The baseline
comparison, however, is unclear. Is it all other identifications? White
identifications of Black perpetrators? Black identifications of white
perpetrators? Identifications of Black perpetrators where the de-
scriptions are sparse? The Court's reasoning is particularly murky
• • 319
because of its prior treatment of an earlier case, Stovall v. Denno.1
Stovall concerned an extremely suggestive hospital room show-up,'
but the Court did not discuss or draw any inferences from the fact
that the victim was white and the accused was Black.32
ii. Schlup v. Delo
The second relevant Supreme Court case was decided in 1995.
In Schlup v. Delo,32 a habeas petitioner alleged that constitutional er-
ror at his trial deprived the )ury of critical evidence that would have
established his innocence. Schlup, a white inmate, had been
314. See Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975).
315. Id. at 371-72.
316. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 109.
317. See id. at 116.
318. Id. at 115.
319. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
320. See id. at 295.
321. The ambiguity of the Court's reasoning in Manson is underlined by the sylla-
bus describing the undercover officer as "Negro," id. at 98, suggesting the relevance
of that fact, but not referring to race in its description of the holding.
322. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
323. See id. at 854.
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convicted of participating in the murder of a Black inmate.3 24 Most of
the opinion in Schlup focused on the proper standard for reviewing
successive habeas petitions when the petitioner alleges both factual
innocence and constitutional error. In the course of the opinion,
however, the Supreme Court referred to some of the evidence
Schlup offered to show that he was innocent. The Court stated that
Schlup attempted to supplement the record with "several" detailed
affidavits attesting to his innocence and then described two of these
affidavits.3  With respect to the first affidavit, it is clear from the
Court's description of the inmate and from the parts of the affidavit
it chose to excerpt that the Court viewed the witness' race as rele-
vant to his credibility:
For example, Lamont Griffin Bey, a black inmate, submit-
ted an affidavit in which he stated, "The first thing I saw of
the fight was Rodney [sic] Stewart throw liquid in Arthur
Dade's face, and O'Neal stab him .... I knew Lloyd Schlup
at that time, but we were not friends. Lloyd Schlup was not
present at the scene of the fight." Griffin Bey also stated,
"When this happened, there was a lot of racial tension in
the prison .... I would not stick my neck out normally, but
I am willing to testify because I know Lloyd Schlup is in-
nocent.
' 326
Although it is clear that Bey's race affected his credibility in the
Court's eyes, the process of reasoning through which the Court al-
lowed race to affect its credibility determination is not clear.
Ordinarily, absent an attack on the veracity of a witness, no evidence
to bolster the witness' credibility is admissible. 32 Because Bey's affi-
davit was submitted and rejected by the district court 32 no prior
attack on credibility had been made.
324. See id. at 854-56.
325. Id. at 858 n.18.
326. Id. [citations to record omitted]. The Court followed this quote with a de-
scription of the second inmate's statement: "Similarly, inmate Donell White swore an
affidavit in which he stated, 'Three white guys were coming the opposite way.' "Id. I
would speculate that although the second inmate's words do not make an overt ref-
erence to cross-racial exculpatory testimony, the Court's description of the second
inmate's affidavit as being similar, along with the "three white guys" quote, is in-
tended to imply that Donell White is also Black and that he has the same racially
enhanced reliability.
327. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENcE, § 49 at 115 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984) (stating "[I]n the absence of an attack upon credibility no sustaining evidence is
allowed."); JACK B. WEINSTEIN Er AL., EvIDENE 607[08]; United States v. Arroyo-
Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1146 (2d Cir. 1978).
328. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 858 n.18.
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Perhaps this is a rule peculiar to race. If so, then what is the
scope of this rule? The Court may be implying that any time a Black
person testifies for a white person, that testimony is more likely to
be true. If so, then more likely than what? More likely than if a Black
person testifies for a Black person? More likely than if a white per-
son testifies for a white person? Perhaps the inference is narrower:
when a Black prisoner testifies for a white prisoner, that testimony is
more likely to be true. If so, again, more likely than what? Maybe the
Court is only implying that when a Black prisoner testifies for a
white prisoner and there is racial tension in the prison, that testi-
mony is more likely to be true. Then again, perhaps the Court means
to imply that cross-racial helpfulness enhances credibility any time
there are racial tensions.
In both Manson and Schlup, the permissible credibility infer-
ences are clearly racial, but the nature of those inferences are
unclear. Together, the two cases appear to signal that not all credibil-
ity inferences based on race are prohibited but do nothing to show
what might be prohibited. The two cases also suggest that race and
credibility inferences arise out of reflex, even for the highly trained.
The statements of the majority in Schlup, which are not questioned in
the dissent, are extraordinary statements from a Court that is in-
creasingly committed to a path of color-blindness in racial issues.
What would explain an assumption which is neither self-conscious
nor carefully nuanced, that race is relevant in this context?
C. The Psychological Dynamics of Race and Credibility Assessments
By what process does a fact finder evaluate the worth of testi-
mony offered by a witness? When the Supreme Court first analyzed
the credibility of anonymous informants, it created a two-pronged
test: both the informant's "veracity" and the informant's "basis of
knowledge" had to be demonstrated before a magistrate could justi-
fiably issue a warrant based on the informant's allegations."
Although the Court has since adopted a totality of the circumstances
approach to determine the credibility of informants, 33° this approach,
too, recognizes the dual nature of credibility assessments; it differs
only in permitting a deficiency in one aspect of the assessment to be
compensated for by a strong showing as to the other. Indeed, disre-
garding variations in phrasing, it is hard to imagine a legitimate
credibility determination that would not consider both the likely
329. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
330. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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accuracy of the witness' perceptions and the truthfulness of the wit-
ness' reporting.
Unfortunately, on both the accuracy and the truthfulness fronts,
psychological research suggests that fact finders face substantial
obstacles. Putting aside for the moment the ways that racial
stereotypes may hinder credibility assessments, ordinary assump-
tions about reliability and truthfulness are often mistaken. For
example, as data from eyewitness identifications make abundantly
clear, both the subjects of laboratory experiments and real jurors
give enormous weight to eyewitness identifications, despite the fact
that, as compared to physical or even circumstantial evidence, they
are not very reliable. ' Even in comparing the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications, jurors and mock jurors tend to assume
several facts that are contradicted by the data. For example, most
people believe that stress increases the reliability of an identification
(e.g., "I will never forget that face!"), when in fact stress actually
detracts from reliability.332 Most people also believe that confidence
in an identification is highly correlated with accuracy, but
confidence is in fact more likely to reflect personality factors or
situational "encouragement" than accuracy.3u Many people believe
that cross-racial identifications are less likely to be reliable if the
person making the identification is racially biased, but racial bias
does not seem to affect the rate of cross-racial identification errors. 3M
Nor is legal experience likely to correct such misapprehensions, as
evidenced by forensic psychologists' criticism of the Supreme
Court's list of factors that courts should use to judge the reliability of
identifications.
331. See Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, Eyewitness Identification: Problems and
Pitfalls, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 99
(Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen eds., 1982); Elizabeth Loftus, Reconstructing
Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1974, at 116, 117.
332. See David B. Fishman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Expert Psychological Testimony on
Eyewitness Identification, 4 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 87, 92 (1978) (reviewing research
and concluding that "in general, extreme stress in an identification situation results
in less reliable testimony").
333. See, e.g., C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Confi-
dence, in ADULT EYEwrrIESS TESTIMONY 348 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994).
334. See John C. Brigham & Paul Barkowitz, Do "They All Look Alike?" The Effect of
Race, Sex, Experience, and Attitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces, 8 J. APPLIED SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 306, 309 (1978); Paul J. Lavrakis et al., A Perspective on the Recognition of
Other-Race Faces, 20 PERCEFrION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 475, 480 (1976).
335. See, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen, Testing the Assumption of Neil v. Biggers: An Ex-
periment in Eyewitness Identification, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 358 (1980). With respect to the
accuracy of recollections, eyewitness identifications are the most heavily studied
phenomena. However, new research suggests that other sincere but inaccurate ac-
counts of the past, so-called "false memories," may similarly distort factfinding on
issues other than identification. Researchers have identified a number of qualities
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The literature on the truthfulness prong of credibility determi-
nations is more sparse but no more encouraging. Fact finders often
appear to follow the wrong cues on truthfulness as well as on accu-
racy. Some studies have shown that when observers are asked to
differentiate truthful reports from lies, they do not do much better
than chance.m Although psychologists have discovered several be-
havioral measures that correlate with lying, observers often attend
exclusively to mannerisms (e.g., restlessness, pauses in speech)
which are actually quite poor predictors of truthfulness when the
subject is highly motivated to succeed at lying. Pitch, the muscles
used to produce a smile, the number of times the word "I" was used,
and the number of illustrating asides are all better predictors of
truthfulness-and were all ignored by subjects attempting to judge
truthfulness. 7 Nor is experience the answer; law enforcementyer-
sonnel are no better at detecting falsehoods than are lay people.
How does racial bias fit into this unreliable process? Surpris-
ingly, the available research can only answer this question by
inference. Most of the literature that directly addresses race and
credibility is aimed at a very different issue; how the white therapist
can become credible and trustworthy to the minority client.3 9 The
answer to the question posed in the literature-display sensitivity to
cultural differences-is not helpful in discovering racially biased
that are diagnostic of false memories, including a comparison of the number of sen-
sory characteristics (more common in real memory descriptions) with the number of
verbal hedges and references to thought processes and personal pronouns (more
common in false memories). However, training in these factors does not seem to
much improve the rate of identifying false memories. Elizabeth Loftus et al., Mis-
guided Memories: Sincere Distortions of Reality, in CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT 155 (John C.
Yuille ed., 1989).
336. See, e.g., Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Detecting Deception from the Body
or Face, 29 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 288, 292 (1974) (finding that
sample of test participants who had not been shown film by which to familiarize
themselves with speaker's mannerisms were accurate in assessing truth of speaker's
statements only 43 to 51 percent of the time).
337. See Paul Ekman, Why Lies Fail and What Behaviors Betray a Lie, in CREDIBILITY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 335, at 71.
338. See Ray Bull, Can Training Enhance the Detection of Deception? in CREDIBILITY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 335, at 83.
339. See, e.g., Larry E. Davis & Joe Gelsomino, An Assessment of Practitioner Cross-
Racial Treatment Experiences, 39 SOCIAL WORK 116 (1994); Chalmer E. Thompson et
al., Counselor Content Orientation, Counselor Race, and Black Women's Cultural Mistrust
and Self-Disclosures, 41 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 155 (1994); Priscilla Wade & Bianca
Bernstein, Cultural Sensitivity Training and Counselor's Race: Effects on Black Female
Clients' Perceptions and Attrition, 38 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 9 (1991); C. Edward
Watkins, Jr. et al., Cultural Mistrust and Its Effects on Expectational Variables in Black
Client-White Counselor Relationships, 36 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 447 (1989); see also
Lerita M. Coleman, Black Students' Reactions to Feedback Conveyed by White and Black
Teachers, 21 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 460 (1991).
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credibility assessments m The nature and varied forms of American
racism, however, suggest a variety of ways in which credibility de-
terminations may be swayed by race.
Psychologists who study race continue to refine their theories of
how race influences thought processes. The taxonomies they employ
vary, but for purposes of thinking about race and credibility, the la-
bels are less important than a general sense of the variety of ways in
which people respond to race. For some white subjects, persons of
other races evoke strong feelings of hatred, disgust and anger; some
psychologists call such persons "dominative racists.' ' For others,
the primary emotion concerning race is the desire to avoid contact
with persons of color; some researchers refer to such persons as
"aversive racists."3' Yet another group harbors stereotyped views
that influence their thinking processes without emotions of either
anger or avoidance?30 Stereotypic biases may occur automatically or
without conscious awareness, even in persons who would disavow
racist beliefs. Moreover, it appears that such persons process stereo-
type-consistent evidence more extensively than they do stereotype-
inconsistent evidence?"
Whether each of these groups should be labeled "racist" is
subject to argument,3" but clearly each poses a threat to the
reliability of credibility determinations. For the classic dominative
racist, animosity may overwhelm the credibility issue. Thus, in To
Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus explains the jury's decision as follows:
"There's something in our world that makes men lose their heads-
they couldn't be fair if they tried. In our courts, when it's a white
man's word against a black man's word, the white man always
340. A matter of somewhat greater relevance is why this is the primary aspect of
race and credibility that has been investigated, a matter which I leave to the reader's
speculation.
341. See JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 121-24 (1972); JOEL KOVEL,
WHrE RACISM 54-55 (1970); see also Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The
Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUrGERS L. REv. 673, 687 (1985).
342. See Jones, supra note 341, at 121-24; Kovel, supra note 341, at 54-55; Pettigrew,
supra note 341, at 687.
343. See generally Galen Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making
and Memory: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 726 (1988); Patricia Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1986) (presenting evi-
dence that stereotypes illicit high and low prejudicial responses in general).
344. See Bodenhausen, supra note 343; Devine, supra note 343.
345. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995) (arguing that the category of stereotyp-
ing by low-prejudice subjects should not be called racist.).
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wins."34 From the perspective of the dominative racist, credibility is
beside the point: it is the outcome that matters.
The situation of the aversive racist is more complicated. She has
no racially motivated desire to inflict harm upon the Black defen-
dant. The aversive racist's aversion to and desire for distance from a
Black witness may, however, prevent her from being able to identify
with the Black witness. Perhaps she is more ready to believe "they"
lie for each other. This may be the most likely explanation for Judge
Bristow's decision in Ricky Drayton's case, 7 although racial ani-
mosity is also a real possibility.
Even if the fact finder is neither a dominative nor an aversive
racist, race may still influence her credibility determinations. There
are many stereotypes of racial minorities, but two are particularly
important in credibility determinations. To the extent that the accu-
racy of a recollection is at issue, perceptions of intelligence are
important, and to the extent that veracity is disputed, perceptions of
honesty are important. With respect to both of these factors, stereo-
types of African Americans would imply lesser credibility. Racial
minorities, particularly African Americans, are seen as less intelli-
gent than the majority.34 Racial minorities, again African Americans
in particular, are also stereotyped as less honest and more criminal
than the majority3 9 In the words of an early legal commentator,
"The negro, as a general rule, is mendacious. . . ."5 Many who
would be appalled by the expression of racial stereotypes are famil-
iar with them, and, laboratory studies suggest, are subconsciously
influenced by them.-1 Perhaps this subconscious influence is the best
346. LEE, supra note 26, at 223.
347. See supra Part I.B.3.
348. See, e.g., JAN PfiERSE, WHITE ON BLACK: IMAGES OF AFRICA AND BLACKS IN
WESrERN POPULAR CuLTURE 152-156 (1992); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution
in Context: The Continuing Significance of Race, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325 , 332 n. 20
(citing 1990 National Opinion Research Center of University of Chicago poll); Harold
Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little Faking, 18 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247,252 (1971).
349. See Sigall & Page, supra note 348, at 252. See generally, Aleinikoff, supra note
348 (observing contemporary examples of racial prejudice); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1618-51 (1985) (reviewing
literature documenting racial bias and prejudice).
350. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 233 (1858) (quoting STEPHEN, WEST INDIAN SLAVERY 177
(n.d.)).
351. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 343, at 15 (finding that even "low-prejudice" per-
sons possess racial stereotypes and exhibit "stereotype-congruent or prejudice-like
responses" unless intentionally inhibiting such responses); Shari L. Kirkland et al.,
Further Evidence of the Deleterious Effects of Overheard Derogatory Ethnic Labels: Deroga-
tion Beyond the Target, 13 PERSONALrTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 216, 219-25 (1987)
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way of understanding Judge Eisele's decision in Barry Lee
352Fairchild's case, or, more precisely, at least the best way of under-
standing Judge Eisele's decision absent any rebuttal of the prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 3 3 In fact, perhaps subconscious
influence is the best way of understanding how any fact finder might
be influenced by race in a credibility determination, good intentions
to the contrary.
Racial stereotypes might also "affect" credibility determinations
in a content-specific way. To the extent that a witness-of any race-
testifies to behavior that conforms to a racial stereotype of the pur-
ported actor, such conformity may enhance that witness' credibility.
Stereotypes about proclivities toward violence and sexual behavior
seem especially likely to form this kind of racially biased
"corroboration" of a witness' testimony.
Finally, race may affect credibility determinations in a manner
that involves neither animosity nor stereotyping. It is well docu-
mented that women's speech patterns are typically more indirect,
more qualified, and less assertive than are men's. At least one re-
searcher has observed that indirect speech patterns are typical of
African American speech as well.35 To the extent that fact finders
find forceful speech more credible, they may more frequently
wrongly devalue the testimony of African American witnesses. Evi-
dence concerning such devaluing, however, is quite spotty
compared to evidence concerning other ways in which race is likely
to influence credibility determinations.
II. CONTROLS ON RACIALLY INFLUENCED
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
As Part I has demonstrated, race influences credibility determi-
nations in a number of ways, some of which are obviously harmful
to the search for truth and justice and some of which are arguably
permissible. As we have also seen, the influence of race upon
credibility determinations occurs at more than one stage in the
criminal process. There is no overarching rule that describes which
inferences about race and credibility are legal, nor is there one
mechanism for redressing illegal uses of race in credibility
(finding that "subjects seemed to be outwardly appalled by the [derogatory ethnic
label] and yet were encouraged by it to engage in [racially biased] behavior").
352. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
353. For a discussion of a prima facie case of racial discriminatory credibility
assessment as applied to the Fairchild case, see supra Part I.B.2.b.
354. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness
in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 271-86 (1993).
355. See Thurmon Garner, Cooperative Communication Strategies: Observations in a
Black Community, 14 J. BLACK STuDIES 233, 234-44 (1983).
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determinations. This section considers mechanisms that could ad-
dress racially influenced credibility determinations at each of three
points in the criminal process and the extent to which those mecha-
nisms have clear and enforced rules about such determinations.
A. Legal Devices for Reviewing Race-Based Credibility
Screening by Advocates
1. Defense Attorneys
A defense attorney may choose not to investigate leads because
he or she discredits them for racially influenced reasons. The Dray-
ton case presents a clear example of an attorney limiting the jury's
credibility prerogatives by his investigative choices. Racial bias
may also influence a defense attorney's decision whether or not to
put a witness-including her client--on the stand by affecting the
attorney's own assessment of the truth of the witness' story or be-
cause of the attorney's assessment of the jury's likely reaction to the
witness.
The obvious procedural vehicle for attacking such racially in-
fluenced assessments by the defense attorney is to argue that
counsel's actions deprived the defendant of the effective assistance
of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him or her. In or-
der to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however,
the defendant must first show that counsel's performance was defi-
cient.3 This requires that counsel "made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment."3' It is only assistance "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases" that must be provided,39
and a court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's con-
duct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy.' "' The circumstances under which a
strategy might be deemed unsound have not been elaborated upon;
the Supreme Court has explicitly refused to establish a checklist for
the evaluation of counsel's conduct.31
356. See supra Part I.B.3.
357. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
358. See id.
359. Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
360. Id. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
361. See id. at 688-89.
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Which, if any, racially influenced assessments of credibility by
an attorney would not be presumed to be sound trial strategy would
seem to depend both upon the actions of other attorneys and upon
the specific circumstances of the case.6 It is clear, however, that fail-
ure to investigate may be determined to be a reasonable strategic
choice, even under circumstances where investigation would create
no risk to the defense. 3u Moreover, even if a reviewing court were to
find that the attorney's judgment could not be seen as sound trial
strategy, the defendant must also show prejudice, defined as "a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."3" This standard
has been notoriously difficult to meet.
2. Prosecutors
Prosecutors, too, might screen the credibility of witnesses in a
racially biased way. To the extent that racial bias influences their
decisions to prosecute, such practices are probably unreviewable.3"
Prosecutors are also under a duty to disclose evidence that is favor-
able where that evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.'
A prosecutor's failure to disclose such evidence to the defense ne-
cessitates the reversal of the defendant's conviction,36 whether or
not the failure is due to the prosecutor's assessment that the evi-
dence is not credible.
Thus, with respect to racially influenced decisions by attorneys
to preclude jury determinations of credibility, the explanation mat-
ters for defense counsel but does not matter for the prosecutor. For a
convicted defendant to mount a successful challenge on either
grounds, however, he or she has to have knowledge of the racially
362. See, e.g., Kornegay v. State, 329 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. App. 1985). In Kornegay, de-
fense counsel had used racial epithets in front of the jury to describe African
American defendants charged with the rape of a white woman. Id. at 603. Defense
counsel also told the jury that he had said to the defendants "Y'all n*****s 40 or 50
years ago you would be lynched for something like this .... Id. The court reversed
the defendants convictions, but only by a five-to-four vote. See id. at 601.
363. See Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1986).
364. Id.
365. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding that selective
prosecution claims must show both discriminatory effect and discriminatory pur-
pose and noting that "prosecutorial discretion is broad" and "courts [are] properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute").
366. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Material evidence is defined as
evidence that, had it been disclosed to the defense, would create a reasonable prob-
ability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
367. See id.
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biased decision and be able to show that had the decision been oth-
erwise, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. Establishing such reasonable
probability in turn would depend upon the reviewing court's as-
sessment of the credibility of the witnesses whose testimony was
precluded. I have found no cases applying these standards to ra-
cially influenced credibility determinations.
B. Legal Devices for Regulating Racially Influenced Assessments of
Credibility at the Guilt Adjudication Stage
If we could assume the actions of counsel had not resulted in
racially biased screening of witnesses, we would next need to ask
whether race improperly influenced the credibility determination of
the fact finder at trial, either judge or jury. Four legal structures
might conceivably exert some control over biased decision making
at the guilt adjudication stage: constraints on voir dire, prohibitions
against inflammatory arguments, impeachments of convictions for
juror misconduct, and reviews of the sufficiency of evidence sup-
porting a conviction.
1. Voir Dire
It is fair to assume that if a juror were asked whether he or she
would be less likely to believe an African than a white person, and
the juror answered affirmatively, that the juror would be dismissed
for cause. But how often would this happen? As I have discussed
elsewhere at greater length, voir dire is largely ineffective for rooting
out racial bias.m In part, voir dire is ineffective because it is unavail-
able; even in white victim/Black defendant crimes there is no
constitutional right to raise even a single question concerning racial
prejudice.39 Moreover, even when courts do permit questions con-
cerning racial prejudice, they generally limit counsel to one or two
questions on the issue. Furthermore, voir dire is sometimes directed
at the entire venire panel rather individual jurors. Attorneys who
368. See generally Johnson, supra note 349; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism
and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Johnson, supra note 12; John-
son, note 298.
369. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); cf. Turner v Murray, 476 U.S. 26
(1986) (holding that only in interracial capital cases is the accused entitled to ques-
tion potential jurors on the issue of race bias and that even then, the trial judge
retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject). Moreover,
few state courts have found such a right under state statutes or state constitutions.
See Johnson, supra note 349, at 1673-74 (reviewing relevant cases).
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have been allowed to conduct extended voir dire, however, report
that jurors will usually only reveal bias after they have been asked
numerous specific questions." Finally, even if specific questions are
asked, jurors might not reveal their biases; fear of social disapproval
will in many cases inhibit candid responses among the consciously
racist, and lack of self-awareness will tend to inhibit others.
2. Inflammatory Arguments
Advocates are prohibited, at least in theory, from exacerbating
the worst kinds of juror predisposition toward racially skewed
credibility determinations. Racially inflammatory questions and ar-
guments are generally impermissible, either because they violate the
relevance constraints on admissible evidence or because they violate
the Due Process Clause.37' Modern courts have universally con-
cluded that arguments that one race is more credible than another
371
and arguments that members of one race are likely to lie for one an-
other 3  are racially inflammatory and therefore impermissible.
Courts have also deemed impermissible arguments that an accusa-
tion is especially credible because the accuser, like the defendant, is
Black. 74 Not all cases in which prosecutors have made such argu-
ments result in reversals, 3m however, because courts may view an
inflammatory remark as "isolated" or "not thematic" and therefore
376insufficient to violate due process. 6Moreover, comments that to my
370. See Johnson, supra note 349, at 1674-75 (reviewing literature).
371. See supra Part lI.B.2.
372. See Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that U.S.
Attorney's comment that "Not one white witness has been produced in this case that
contradicts [the white prosecution witness'] position in this case" violated African-
American defendant's right to equal protection); People v. Richardson, 363 N.E.2d
924 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that prosecutor's comments contrasting the credibil-
ity of Black witnesses with "our society" deprived defendant of a fair trial); State v.
Kamel, 466 N.E.2d 860, 866 (Ohio 1984) (finding that prosecutor's claim that defense
witnesses of Middle Eastern descent were unreliable was "unwarranted and inap-
propriate").
373. See Richardson, 363 N.E.2d at 926 (holding that prosecutor's claim that Black
witnesses would lie to protect "one of their own" deprived defendant of a fair trial);
Kamel, 466 N.E.2d at 866 (finding that prosecutor's claim that defense witnesses of
Middle Eastern descent lied for the Syrian-born defendants because they were the
defendants' "countryman" was "unwarranted and inappropriate").
374. See McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1979).
375. See generally Johnson, supra note 298, at 1776-90 (cataloging reasons courts
have not reversed convictions where racially inflammatory arguments have been
made).
376. See, e.g., People v. Bramlett, 569 N.E.2d 1139, 1145-47 (111. App. Ct. 1991)
(holding that defendant was not denied a fair trial where prosecutor had commented
during cross-examination and closing argument that incriminating testimony of ar-
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mind clearly imply that white people are more likely to tell the truth
are sometimes deemed nonracial. For example, the Seventh Circuit
recently declared that referring to a Black witness "shucking and
jiving" on the stand was not necessarily a racial comment concerning
credibility.3z7 In another case where a prosecutor asked the jury,
"Who are you going to believe in this case? It is absolutely black and
white," the court found no racial overtones despite the fact that the
prosecutor's witness was white and the defense witness was Black.
m
Finally, uncertainty about which uses of race in credibility de-
terminations are forbidden and which are not have further
hampered regulation of biased arguments about credibility. Some
courts have viewed as appropriate arguments that a white rape vic-
tim's credibility is enhanced because white women are not likely to
consent to sex with Black men.m One court held permissible a prose-
cutor's statement that he had difficulty telling African Americans
apart in order to explain the prosecution witness' doubts regarding
the identity of one of the defendants.m
3. Juror Misconduct
It might seem that the problem with a claim of biased jury ad-
judication of credibility is that it is too speculative. As demonstrated
in Part I, the most convincing cases of biased adjudications of
credibility come from habeas cases where judicial opinions supply
some of the decision maker's reasoning.3' A claim of jury bias need
not be speculative or even inferential, however, for sometimes jurors
will come forward with information about the role that race played
in jury deliberations. In one case where a juror reported that overt
arguments about race and credibility were made in the jury room,
the reviewing federal court reversed the convictions, viewing racial
prejudice as an improper influence under Rule 606(b). Most state
and federal courts, however, will not allow evidence of racial bias to
resting officer should be believed because both officer and defendant were Black);
People v. Ali, 551 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that defendant was not
deprived of a fair trial by prosecutor's references during direct examination and
summation to race of police officers and informant).
377. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1995).
378. People v. O'Quinn, 537 N.Y.S.2d 626, 626 (App. Div. 1989).
379. See State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah 1989); Miller v. North Carolina,
583 F.2d 701, 704-05 (4th Cir. 1978); State v. Bautista, 514 P.2d 530,532 (Utah 1973).
380. See Patterson v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
381. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
382. See Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290-91 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
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impeach a verdict.' Although some commentators have been sup-
portive of the contrary minority position,- this position seems
unlikely to spread. In the federal courts, the Supreme Court's adop-
tion of a highly restrictive view of the "outside influence exception"
to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 606's prohibition against juror im-
peachment of verdicts in Tanner v. United States8 5 probably precludes
impeachment through evidence of racially biased deliberations. On
the other hand, if jurors complain during deliberations about im-
proper remarks by other jurors, a mistrial may be declared.3 The
rule against impeachment of verdicts does not apply in this situation
because no verdict has yet been rendered. Sadly, even in cases where
inflammatory material with egregiously racial content has been
placed before deliberating jurors and reported before a verdict was
reached, the trial court may choose not to have a hearing on the im-
pact of that material, and the conviction will nevertheless be upheld
upon appealW
Of course, even if the rules regarding juror misconduct were
different, one can think of several reasons why it would not be likely
to affect many cases. First, individuals are often loath to report their
own misconduct; second, the rules concerning what constitutes mis-
conduct are not dear; and third, biased assessments of credibility
seem to occur most often without much discussion, given the formal
norm of equality.
383. See, e.g., Shilcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1987); Martinez v.
Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167,
169 (S.D. 1983); Dunkins v. State, 838 S.W.2d 898,900-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
384. See generally Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify That Verdict Was the
Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 125 (arguing that Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b) should not exclude jurors from testifying that racial bias
tainted deliberations); Robert E. Schumacker, Note, Racial Slurs by Jurors as Grounds
for Impeaching a Jury's Verdict, State v. Shillcut 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1481 (1985)
(describing a three-part test developed in two Wisconsin cases prior to Shillcut to
determine when evidence of juror statements evincing racial prejudice is grounds for
impeaching a jury's verdict).
385. 483 U.S. 107 (1987). In Tanner, the Court held that a district court was correct
in refusing to hold a hearing in which jurors could testify concerning the intoxication
and drug abuse of other jury members, id. at 127, based on the finding that such in-
formation did not constitute an "outside influence," id. at 122. See also Hance v. Zant,
114 S. Ct. 1392 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (opposing denial of certiorari in case
where evidence suggested that trial and sentencing were infected with racism).
386. See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1986)
(reversing conviction where trial court failed to declare mistrial in the face of racial
and religious slurs).
387. See, e.g., Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 919, 920 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (trial judge did not hold hearing when
juror presented bailiff with a drawing of a stick figure on the gallows, with the words
"Hang the n*****s" written under it).
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4. Proof of Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Absent "tattling" (and often despite tattling, as discussed
above),m jurors may act upon egregiously biased credibility deter-
minations with virtual impunity. Although the Due Process Clause
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the
crime charged,3 when assessing whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to warrant a conviction under this standard, courts have
reasoned that all questions of the credibility of witnesses must be re-
solved in favor of the prosecution.3 9' Viewed from this perspective,
arguments that a jury wrongly assessed credibility based on race
would not implicate the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. While many reviewing courts have an "interests of justice"
jurisdiction through which they can do more than determine legal
insufficiency,39' courts are reluctant to reweigh conflicting testimony
even when they have the jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, reversals
that involve such reweighing of evidence generally result in re-
mands for new trials rather than in the dismissal of charges (as
would be required by a finding of legally insufficient proof). 92 1 am
unaware of any case in which the need to reweigh evidence was at-
tributed to biased credibility determinations by the jury.393
388. See supra Part H.B.3.
389. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
390. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319 (1979).
391. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) (referring to appellate court's
ability to act as a "thirteenth juror" by reversing convictions based on disagreement
with jury's resolution of conflicting testimony). In New York, the first tier appellate
court, the Appellate Division, has jurisdiction to review both questions of law and
questions of fact, but the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, for
the most part has only the power to review questions of law. ROBERT MACCRATE Er
AL., APPELLATE JusTIcE iN NEw YORK 46, 48-49 (1982).
392. See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42.
393. Trial judges also often have the power to reverse verdicts in the "interests of
justice." They may be somewhat more likely to do so because they have personally
viewed the witnesses. Some of these reversals may involve the judge's conscious
consideration of a jury's racially biased assessments of credibility. See MICHAEL L.
RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, 191-92 (1992) (describing case in which
Black judge reversed based on dubious white cross-racial identifications, but appel-
late court reinstated verdict); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 148-49 (1975)
(describing trial judge's reversal of conviction in second Scottsboro trial, because the
judge found the evidence weighed clearly on the side of the defense after one of the
two alleged rape victims had recanted her testimony).
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C. Legal Devices for Controlling the Influence of Race on
Credibility Assessments in the Post-Conviction Process
1. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
If race has influenced credibility assessments in state post-
conviction proceedings (as it appears to have in Drayton),3 4 the lan-
guage of the old habeas statute seemed to provide a mechanism for
challenging that biased assessment. Before 1996, the habeas statute
presumed the findings of a state court trier of fact to be correct if the
state court, after a "full and fair hearing" had reliably found the
relevant facts.3 95 If the state hearing was not full and fair, a federal
hearing on the contested factual questions was mandatory.396 The
habeas statute therefore commanded a new hearing in any case
where judicial impartiality was lacking.39 Now that the habeas stat-
ute has been revised, section 2254(e) describes the deference that
must be given state court findings. Although there is no explicit ref-
erence to a full and fair hearing, federal courts still have the power
to hold evidentiary hearings, and Townsend v. Sain398 would appear
to still govern the circumstances in which they should do so. Town-
send requires that a hearing be held in a number of circumstances,
one of which is when the state fact-finding procedure was not ade-
quate to provide a full and fair hearing.39
Moreover, in the context of another issue involving race
discrimination, the Supreme Court has declared that "a claim that
the court has discriminated on the basis of race in a given case
brings the integrity of the judicial system into direct question" and
provides a particularly compelling justification for federal habeas
corpus review.& Thus, under either the new or old habeas statute it
appears that if a habeas petitioner could establish racial
discrimination in the assessment of a witness' credibility, the
petitioner would be entitled to a wholly new determination by the
federal court. Despite this structure, because of the frequency with
which courts defer to the credibility of other fact finders, some
394. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
395. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105, repealed by Act of Apr.
24, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218.
396. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
397. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105, repealed by Act of
Apr. 24, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218.; see also Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of
Corrections, 8 F.3d 509, 514 (1993) ("Suggestions of judicial impropriety always re-
ceive our highest attention because they undermine respect for law.").
398. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
399. See id. at 312.
400. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,548 (1979).
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federal courts might reflexively defer to credibility findings4°' as the
magistrate in Drayton did.40
2. Federal Habeas Corpus
There is no structure in place to review a federal judge's factual
determinationso for racially biased credibility determinations.
Moreover, with regard to racially influenced assessments of credibil-
ity in both state and federal courts, as with all other racially
influenced assessments of credibility, the legal system lacks stan-
dards for judging what inferences or assumptions are forbidden.
Racially biased4 credibility assessments contradict norms
about equality and threaten the ascertainment of truth, yet racially
biased credibility determinations persist. They persist for at least
three reasons. First, the cognitive structures of many decision mak-
ers predispose them to believe that race influences both the ability
and propensity to tell the truth.4°5 At least in the short run, the law is
powerless to change such predispositions.
The second and third reasons, however, are directly attributable
to the law. No court has attempted to describe, at least in any com-
prehensive way, which racial influences on credibility
determinations are forbidden. Because the Supreme Court itself has
in contemporary cases at least twice drawn inferences about reliabil-
ity from race,4 6 other decision makers may infer permission to do so
as well. The Court did not explain its reasoning in either case, so
there are no guidelines as to where that permission ends.4 More-
401. A federal court may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses whose de-
meanor was observed by the state trier of fact, but not by the federal court, and
thereby conclude that the findings were not "fairly supported by the record" as pro-
vided by § 2254(d)(8) of the old federal habeas statute. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422 (1983). A habeas claim alleging a biased fact finder, however, would be
based on § 2254(d)(6) of the old statute, which requires that the hearing was "full,
fair and adequate," rather than on § 2254(d)(8). Such a claim would not ask the fed-
eral court to assess the credibility of witnesses it has not seen, but would instead ask
the court to hold a hearing, after which it could ascertain the credibility of the wit-
nesses who testify at the hearing.
402. See supra Part I.B.3.
403. In federal cases, a federal judge makes the initial post-conviction findings. In
state cases, a federal judge would make factual findings only after concluding that
the conditions of § 2254(d) had not been met.
404. Here I postpone, for a moment, the question of which racially influenced de-
terminations are racially biased.
405. See supra Part I.C.
406. See supra Part I.B.4.c (discussing Schiup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995); Man-
son v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)).
407. In this respect, I think the legal treatment of race and credibility issues re-
sembles the legal treatment of race and detention issues. Because the Supreme Court
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over, there is neither a comprehensive mechanism nor an effective
pastiche of mechanisms to enforce whatever prohibitions against
racially biased assessments of credibility might be inferred from
general equal protection law. Both of these judicial contributions to
the persistence of racially skewed credibility determinations can be
diminished, if not eliminated. What is needed is a clear description
of which race-based credibility inferences are forbidden and a
mechanism for enforcing the resulting prohibitions.
III. PREVENTING RACIALLY BIASED CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
A. Substantive Restrictions on the Credibility Inferences
That May Be Drawn from Race
The most important constraint on the use of race in credibility
determinations is the Equal Protection Clause.4 Although the Equal
Protection Clause applies only to governmental action, each of the
decisions discussed thus far, including the jury verdicts, constitute
governmental action. The state cannot insulate itself from equal pro-
tection mandates by delegating discrimination to private
individuals. Actions taken by private individuals will be attributed
to the state when individuals perform traditional governmental
functions or when the state participates in private discrimination
in important ways.41° Certainly the adjudication of criminal liability
is a public function "traditionally reserved exclusively to the
State." ' "[Slignificant involvement" of the state, and even a
"symbiotic relationship, 412 between the jury and the state, is present
by virtue of the fact that the state calls together the jury, instructs it
has stated that race is a legitimate factor in detention decisions relating to immigra-
tion violations, but has not explained its reasoning, some lower courts have felt free
to allow the use of race in other contexts, such as drug courier profiles and racial
incongruity cases. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
408. Although the so-called "relevance rules" of evidence also place some re-
straints on the evidence that may be introduced, see, e.g., FED. R. EvlD. 403-415, when
race is involved the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause requirements will
be stricter than the limitations of the relevance rules. Evidentiary prohibitions
against inflammatory arguments and against evidence with substantially more
prejudicial effect than probative value, see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403, may often overlap
with equal protection constraints. In particular, evidentiary prohibitions may regu-
late the manner in which testimony must be presented or phrased.
409. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
410. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
411. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
412. Id.; Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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as to its task, and relies upon its conclusions to determine whether
or not criminal penalties may be imposed upon the defendant.413
Given that the Supreme Court has recently determined that defense
counsel are state actors when they select a jury, 1' it is difficult to
imagine how the Court would find that jurors are not state actors
when they decide the outcome of a case. Thus, guilt determina-
tions-and, as a part of those determinations, credibility
assessments-must be subject to equal protection constraints.
Assuming all of these credibility assessments are subject to
equal protection analysis, the question then arises as to the proper
level of scrutiny. If the classification that influences the credibility
assessment is based upon race or national origin, and the purpose of
the classification is not remedial in nature,1 5 then the classification is
subject to "strict scrutiny '4 16 and must be "precisely tailored to serve
a compelling governmental interest."47 This is so whether the racial
classification is explicit or facially neutral, as long as it is traceable to
a racially discriminatory purpose.1 8 If the classification is not racial,
then the criteria for determining the issue (credibility, in this case)
need only bear "some fair relationship to a legitimate public pur-
pose.""' 9
We have seen a wide variety of race and credibility inferences,
most of which clearly involve racial classifications, and a few of
which do not. The permissibility of such inferences under the Equal
Protection Clause depends both upon the way in which race is used
and on the justifications that are offered for that use. Because of the
range and number of racial inferences that have been employed, I
will first consider inferences that bear on a witness' truthfulness,
and then turn to those that bear upon the witness' accuracy.
413. Because the Sixth Amendment prevents a state from trying criminal offenses
without a jury (unless the defendant waives the right to a jury), the state is wholly
dependent on the actions of the jurors for the enforcement of its criminal laws.
414. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). I mean this only as a posi-
tive observation and not as an endorsement of McCollum. Several aspects of
McCollum are extremely disturbing. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, supra note 12, at 43-51.
415. I add this qualifier to avoid citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989), or Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), to support my
argument, which I cannot yet bring myself to do.
416. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
417. Id.
418. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
419. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
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1. Inferences from Race to Truthfulness
a. Witness-Specific Racial Motivations
At one extreme of the range of racially influenced inferences
about truthfulness are those that, while alluding to race, do not in-
volve generalizations about the characteristics, behavior, or
appropriate treatment of a racial or ethnic group. The influence of
race in such situations is specific to the individual witness and as-
sumed from facts specific to that witness. For example, considering
all the facts now known, inferring that Detective Fuhrman's testi-
mony in the O.J. Simpson case is less credible because of his racial
bias is not a racial classification. That is, the inference that his testi-
mony against an African American is less reliable than his testimony
against a European American is not based upon Fuhrman's race or
even the interaction of his race with O.J. Simpson's race, but upon
his own statements and conduct. Similarly, a witness asked why she
did not immediately report a crime might answer that it was be-
cause the only people she had contact with immediately after the
crime were white (or Black) and that she was afraid to report any-
thing to people of that race.
It is important to note that a prosecutor's argument that a wit-
ness' actions could be explained by the race of the persons around
her, absent testimony from the witness that race-based fear did in
fact influence her actions, does involve a racial generalization, as
would a juror's inference that a white police officer is likely to be
biased against a Black defendant, absent testimony suggesting that
the officer in question was so biased."' In contrast, arguments and
inferences about racial motivation that are truly witness-specific do
not involve racial generalizations and therefore do not invoke strict
scrutiny. This is not to say that such testimony or argument might
not be objectionable on the basis of the inflammatory manner in
which it was phrased*' but only that an inference from witness-
420. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 549 N.E.2d 446 (Mass. App. Ct.), Iv. app.
denied, 552 N.E.2d 863 (1990) (reviewing case in which victim testified that she did
not immediately report her rape because she had only come in contact with African-
Americans and that she was frightened of Black persons).
421. For a discussion of how such arguments fare under strict scrutiny, see supra
Part IlI.A.1.
422. See, e.g., Washington, 549 N.E.2d at 448 (Brown, J., concurring) (finding
"most objectionable the manner in which the prosecutor framed his questions" about
the race of the defense witnesses, but voting to affirm conviction because of defense
counsel's failure to object).
SUMMER 1996]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
specific racial motivation evidence does not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.4
b. Racial Characteristics
At the other extreme of the range of racially influenced credibil-
ity assessments are assertions relating to supposed racial or ethnic
characteristics. Obvious examples from the cases described above
include arguments that white witnesses should be believed over
Black witnesses, that Haitians lie because it is dangerous to tell the
truth in Haiti, that people from the Middle East tend to be dishonest,
and that Gypsies think lying is acceptable.4 4 Only slightly more
subtle is the characterization of an African American as "shucking
and jiving on the stand." ' All inferences from a supposed racial or
ethnic characteristic of honesty or dishonesty invoke strict scrutiny,
and I cannot imagine an argument that such blatantly stereotyped
decision making would survive strict scrutiny. Although the gov-
ernment may have a compelling interest in convicting the guilty, the
use of racial generalizations about honesty is not narrowly tailored,
or indeed, tailored at all, to that interest.
c. Racial Propensity
Arguments that bolster or impeach the credibility of a witness
by calling on supposed racial propensity to act or not act as the
witness has testified are similarly extreme and also must fail under a
strict scrutiny standard. To take the most frequently reported
example, any argument or inference that a rape complainant's
denial of consent is enhanced by the "fact" that white women do not
want to have sex with Black men involves a racial classification.
Inferences that Black women are less likely to be telling the truth
when they deny consent because of "looser morals" are another
423. Cf. Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Locquitur: of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Baye-
sians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (arguing that evidence
of race-based justifications of the reasonableness of criminal defendants claiming self-
defense should not be accepted, because to do so violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
424. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
425. Smith v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Ind. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934
(1988).
426. See State v. Bautista, 514 F.2d 530, 532-33 (Utah 1973) (holding that prosecu-
tor was within permissible discretion in arguing that the complainant, "the daughter
of a dentist and a religious person," would not go out with someone of a different
race); see also supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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example.w Similarly, inferences that testimony is likely to be
truthful because it comports with the supposed propensity of
African Americans to engage in violence4 or not truthful because it
accuses a white person of crimes believed to be more typical of Black
429persons are racial generalizations that invoke strict scrutiny.4°
Again, it is clear that such inferences cannot survive strict scrutiny;
any use of race to predict guilt in an individual case would be vastly
over-inclusive as well as vastly under-inclusive, and hence not
narrowly tailored.
d. Intraracial Alibis or Other Exonerating Testimony
Inferences that a witness is more likely to be lying because the
witness is testifying for a person of the same race also involve a race-
based generalization. It might be argued that no racial classification
is involved because symmetrical burdens are imposed on each
group, but such an "equal application" theory has long since been
disavowed as a general principle.3 Most recently, in the peremptory
challenge setting, the Court has refused to permit the inference that
Black jurors would be more likely to be biased for a Black
defendant;3 2 such reasoning would seem to control credibility
427. See GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CON-
STRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 201-19 (1989) (finding that jurors are less likely to
believe Black women who allege rape than they are to believe white women who
allege rape); W. LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALrrY
IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 179-80 (1981)
(reputing that 63 percent of a sample taken from a Southern county believed that that
Black women had lower morals than white women).
428. See Rhoden v. State, 274 So. 2d 630, 635 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) (prosecutor
told jury that if they believed the complaining witness, they would have to believe
that defendant "took it, he got him a White woman").
429. See People v. Thomas, 514 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92-93 (App. Div. 1987) (reviewing
case in which prosecutor argued that the African American defendant could not
have believed that white undercover police officers were muggers).
430. Some propensity arguments are not linked to credibility, but more crudely
assert that the defendant is guilty because people of his race are likely to do such
crimes. See, e.g., Shillcut v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing
testimony that juror said, "Let's be logical. He's a Black and he sees a seventeen year
old White girl-I know the type."); Johnson, supra note 298, at 1751-53 (1993)
(discussing imagery that relates to violence and criminality). These arguments and
inferences also violate the Equal Protection Clause, but are outside the scope of this
article.
431. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (holding that equal appli-
cation does not end judicial inquiry into racial classification).
432. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ("[T]he Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely.., on the assump-
tion that black jurors as a group will be unable to impartially to consider the State's
case against a black defendant."); cf id. at 137-38 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (arguing
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inferences of bias based on shared race as well. A racial classification
is present in both cases, and in neither case is an assumption of
greater likelihood of bias narrowly tailored.4'
Just as Batson allows a prosecutor to justify a peremptory chal-
lenge with a showing that a particular Black juror was biased for the
defendant, one can imagine a situation in which a witness could be
shown to have a motive to lie for the defendant. This motive could
even be racial; the prosecutor might have elicited testimony from the
witness that she had said she would lie for any person of her race
charged with a crime or would lie for the defendant because the de-
fendant was a member of her race.4 Such testimony, however, is
probably largely in the realm of imagination, except perhaps for
members of hate groups.
e. Intraracial Accusations or Other Inculpatory Testimony
What about arguments or inferences that the credibility of an
accusation is enhanced by the shared race of the accused and the ac-
cuser? Although the parallel to Batson is not as close, these too
violate the Equal Protection Clause. As with racial similarity and
exculpatory testimony, a racial classification is present. What could
support the underlying generalization? It would appear that it de-
pends upon two assumptions. One must first assume that members
of racial minorities are loathe to cause trouble for each other, or at
least loathe to bring criminal accusations against each other. What is
the evidence that this is so? Certainly most accusations by racial mi-
norities are against other racial minorities, as witnessed by the far
greater rates of reported intraracial crime (both by racial minorities
and the racial majority) than of interracial crime. I suppose that does
not demonstrate, however, that there is not some reluctance to make
an intraracial accusation, but only that the reluctance, if present, is
sometimes overcome. But even assuming such reluctance exists, one
must also assume that in the case of intraracial accusations, it would
be the accuracy of the accusation (rather than a motive for revenge, a
desire to exculpate oneself, a bribe, fear of the true perpetrator or
some other motive likely to distort rather than enhance truthfulness)
that would overcome this reluctance. This too is possible, I suppose,
but a lot more than mere possibility is necessary to meet the strict
scrutiny standard.
that equal application of the peremptory challenge to all groups is not discrimina-
tory).
433. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.




It is difficult to imagine a legitimate, truly individualized form
of the intraracial-accusation argument that would not involve racial
classification. I can think of only one: a prosecutor might legiti-
mately attempt to rebut a charge of a racially motivated prosecution
by pointing out that the prosecution followed from an intraracial
accusation.
f. Interracial Alibis or Other Exculpatory Testimony
"When helpful testimony comes from a person of a different
race, it is more likely to be true." This is the inference that the Su-
preme Court appears to endorse in Schlup v. Delo.435 Stated that
baldly, the assertion seems preposterous, not to mention violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. If Schlup's witnesses had all been
white, would the opposite conclusion have been justified? Even
more disturbing, if Schlup were Black, could the Supreme Court
have come to the opposite conclusion? That is, whether Schlup is
executed or gets another hearing on his innocence claim depends
upon his race.
This cannot be right. It would seem that the inference of greater
credibility of interracial exonerating testimony is simply the reflec-
tion of the inference of less credibility of intraracial exonerating
testimony, an inference that the Court's reasoning in Batson would
prohibit.4
I do not think that it is possible to explain away the racial refer-
ences in Schlup. First, the Supreme Court tells the reader that is
choosing among "several" inmate affidavits;3 7 given its holding for
Schlup, the Court certainly would have chosen to recite those affi-
davits it found most helpful to Schlup's case. Second, the Court
itself, rather than the affidavit from which it quotes, identifies the
affiant, Lamont Griffin Bey, as Black.m Third, the Court does not
quote the full affidavit, but chooses to include in its quote Bey's
statement, "When this happened, there was a lot of racial tension in
the prison .... I would not stick my neck out normally, but I am
willing to testify because I know Lloyd Schlup is innocent."439
435. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
436. Batson must be interpreted to have prohibited assumptions that a white juror
would be more fair in judging a Black defendant, just as it prohibited assumptions
that a Black juror would be less fair. Without such a prohibition, the holding in Bat-
son would have been meaningless; a prosecutor could justify a challenge by saying
she was attempting to gain a "more fair" juror rather than lose a "less fair" juror.
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Can the Court's inference of enhanced credibility be justified by
the prison setting, the atmosphere of racial tension, or the two fac-
tors combined? Consider how we might try to individualize the
claim of enhanced interracial reliability (that is, transform it into an
inference that was witness-specific). If the state had attempted to
impeach Griffin Bey's testimony by arguing that it was a recent fab-
rication, Schlup could have tried to bolster Bey's testimony by
showing, for example, a prior consistent statement made before the
motive to fabricate arose. Alternatively, Schlup might show, by ex-
trinsic evidence, that the alleged motive to fabricate did not exist.
Thus, if the state had argued that Bey was lying because of a moti-
vation based on racial solidarity (which, as discussed above, the
state ordinarily should not be allowed to do),"0 Schlup could counter
by showing that Bey was not of the same race.
This is obviously not what happened in Schlup. Suppose, how-
ever, that the state had argued that a code leads all prisoners to lie
for each other."' Perhaps now Schlup could have Griffin Bey testify
that the prison code does not extend to persons of another race or
that his own racial animosity would override the code. Such a move
would resemble what happens when a defendant claims that a gov-
ernment witness is lying because he or she has been granted
immunity or entered into some other agreement with the govern-
ment. At that point, the government may introduce the cooperation
agreement and show that it is conditioned on the provision of truth-
ful testimony from the witness.
If valid, this analogy might explain what happened in Schlup.
However, there was no attempt in Schlup by the state to impeach
through a charge of fabrication. Indeed, there could not have been
such an attempt, because there was no testimony; the district court
had refused to accept the affidavits or hear the testimony.0 The
general rule, of course, is that a party may not bolster the credibility
of a witness absent a prior attack."0 In other words, in the absence of
a charge that prisoner solidarity (or mendacity) had caused Griffin
Bey to lie, there could not have been an individualized response as-
serting that such solidarity (or mendacity) was inapplicable because
Bey and Schlup were of different races.
440. See supra Part EII.A.l.d.
441. By my analysis, this is distinguishable from arguing that racial solidarity
prompted the lie, because the status of being a prisoner is not suspect, and such an
argument should be permitted.
442. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 858 n.18.
443. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608 (providing that "evidence of truthful character is
admissible [to support a witness' credibility] only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked").
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The only defense that I can imagine for the Court's clear impli-
cation that race enhanced Bey's credibility here is that it assumed
there would be an attack on any inmate's truthfulness-a charge of
recent fabrication for gain, fabrication due to an inmate code, or
fabrication due to a mendacity argued to be common in inmates-
and that the district court would be skeptical of inmate testimony
even without that attack having yet been made. If this explanation is
correct, then it is the strength of the Court's negative views about
inmates that causes the blindness to equal protection concerns. This
explanation, if correct, implies that Schlup should be read narrowly;
on this reading, inferences of enhanced credibility from interracial
exculpatory testimony in other contexts are not endorsed.
g. Interracial Accusations or Other Inculpatory Testimony
What about an argument or inference that an interracial accu-
sation is prompted by racial animosity? As discussed above, " such
arguments and inferences are easily justified under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause when they are witness-specific, for no racial
generalization is involved and the burden of justification is therefore
low. One can, however, imagine a more generalized (and thus more
questionable) variation on such an argument. In the context of the
O.J. Simpson case, for instance, consider an argument made without
the testimony concerning Detective Fuhrman's individual racial bias that
the Los Angeles Police Department is racist and that the testimony
of its officers (including that of Fuhrman) should therefore be
doubted when it is directed at a Black defendant.
One manner of viewing such an inference is to see it as akin to
witness-specific motivation. Although the evidence of bias is not pe-
culiar to the individual police officer, it is peculiar to members of the
LAPD, and the officer is part of the LAPD. Thus, to the extent that
such an inference is a generalization, it is not a racial generalization.
To the extent that the inference is based upon either evidence or
knowledge within the experience of the juror, it could be considered.
What if the witness has not made statements or taken actions
that imply racial motivation and does not belong to an organization
with a racist history? Is it then impermissible to consider impeach-
ing credibility of accusing witnesses through allegations of racial
bias? My tentative analysis (and this may also be a better method of
analyzing the argument about LAPD membership) is that defense
counsel should be allowed to inquire into possible racial animosity if
counsel has a good-faith basis for doing so and if the allegation and
444. See supra Parts IfI.A.l.a and ll.A.2.a.
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motive are described in terms that are not unnecessarily inflamma-
tory."5 Then, if evidence of racial motivation-including demeanor
evidence-is uncovered, the attorney is free to argue the evidence
and the jury is free to consider it. Why? One answer is that the Con-
frontation Clause may mandate, and certainly counsels, permitting
such inquiries;4" the Confrontation Clause would then justify the
racial classification. A more complete answer looks to the reason
that a Confrontation Clause argument is likely to be persuasive: ra-
cial animosity, particularly animosity directed against persons of
color, is common enough that refusing to permit inquiry into such
bias without prior evidence may lead to wrongful convictions.
Clearly the state has a compelling interest in preventing wrongful
convictions based on racial animosity, and I can think of no more
narrowly tailored means of preventing such convictions than by al-
lowing inquiry into the existence of such bias based solely on the
race of the accuser. On the other hand, an argument or inference of
impeached credibility where there has been no evidence (including de-
meanor evidence) of bias adduced and no evidence of membership in a biased
group should be prohibited, because such an argument, while per-
haps still supported by a compelling state interest, is not narrowly
tailored.
2. Inferences from Race to Accuracy
Like race-based inferences to truthfulness, the permissibility of
a race-based inference to accuracy depends upon whether or not the
inference employs a racial classification and, if so, whether or not
that classification is supported by a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored means.
a. Witness-Specific Abilities
Among racially tinged accuracy arguments, the benign extreme
is composed of inferences about accuracy that allude to race but do
not make any generalizations about the abilities of members of a ra-
cial or ethnic group. If, for example, a white witness testified that she
has difficulty distinguishing among African Americans, it would
involve no racial generalization to deem her testimony less likely to
be accurate than the testimony of a person who made no such
445. See Johnson, supra note 298, at 1801.
446. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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statement (whether that person were Black or white)." 7 To take an-
other example, if a witness admits that he is nervous (or agitated or
angry) when in the presence of persons of another race and that he
therefore he has difficulty remembering events that take place in the
presence of a person of that race, strict scrutiny need not be applied
to an inference that testimony from that person about events that
took place in the presence of such persons is less reliable. Indeed,
even if the person were only to say that he is nervous in the presence
of persons of another race, the jury could legitimately add its own
race-neutral premise: people remember events less well when they




At the other extreme are assertions about supposed racial or
ethnic abilities that enhance or detract from the ability to observe,
infer or report. These are clearly racial generalizations that invoke
the strict scrutiny standard and just as clearly are unable to pass it.
Arguments that Black witnesses are less knowledgeable or intelli-
gent than white witnesses violate the Equal Protection Clause,"9 as
would any such inference by a fact finder.4*' Statements about an ex-
pert witness' accent that imply lesser competence are also
impermissible, as are a juror's mimicking of Black dialect.4
447. By contrast, the prosecutor's statement that it is difficult for him to distin-
guish among African Americans in order to explain the prosecution witness' doubt
about the identity of a Black defendant was impermissible. See Patterson v. Com-
monwealth, 555 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). As the reviewing court stated, the
prosecutor's statement implies that the witness' uncertainty was normal, but, con-
trary to the reviewing court's view, such an argument is not proper. See supra Part
m.A.2.d.
448. Alternatively, the jury might add a quite different, but still race-neutral,
premise: sometimes nervousness looks like lying. Adding this premise to the fact
that the witness was testifying in front of persons of another race, the jury might
infer that the witness was more credible than she appeared to be. This too would be
witness-specific and would not invoke strict scrutiny.
449. See supra Part mI.A.2.b.
450. Judge Eisele's comments in the Fairchild case about the fragile personalities
of the Black witnesses suggest this reasoning. See supra Part I.B.2.b.iv.
451. See Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 488 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978) (reviewing case in which juror strutted like a
minstrel and mimicked Black dialect during deliberations).
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c. Intraracial Identifications
The Supreme Court implied in Manson v. Brathwaite452 that an
undercover officer's identification of Brathwaite was more reliable
because the officer and Brathwaite were both Black.453 Although one
could imagine some bizarre scenario in which this would be an in-
dividualized claim about ability (such as if the defendant tried to
impeach the identification as less reliable because it was cross-racial
and the State responded by saying it was not cross-racial), such was
not the case in Brathwaite.
In Brathwaite, the Court of Appeals had commented only that
the description of the suspect was so scant as to fit hundreds of
Black men in the city, and thus that the match between the descrip-
tion and Brathwaite offered no indicia of reliability.14 The Court of
Appeals may have also been implying that the scant description cre-
ated some doubt as to whether the officer who gave the description
had a clear look or good memory of the perpetrator's appearance.
Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court's claim that the racial
match between the witness and the accused enhanced the likelihood
that the witness' identification was accurate depended upon a racial
generalization.
That generalization cannot withstand strict scrutiny. I know of
no evidence that one African American's identification of another
African American is more likely to be accurate than is the typical45
identification; certainly there was no such evidence available at the
time the Court handed down the Brathwaite decision.4s
d. Interracial Identifications
There is, on the other hand, substantial empirical support for
the proposition that many white persons are impaired in their iden-
tifications of African Americans.5 7 Moreover, such impairments
neither depend upon the white observer's racial bias nor are the
subject of her conscious awareness. The state's interest in preventing
the wrongful conviction of its citizens is surely compelling, and un-
der these circumstances, argument and inferences based upon the
452. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
453. See also discussion, supra note 318 and accompanying text.
454. Brathwaite, 527 F.2d at 371.
455. Here I think the relevant "average" is the typical or modal identification
rather than the mean identification. However, I do not know of any data comparing
means either.





lesser accuracy of cross-racial identifications are narrowly tailored to
that interest and therefore permissible.
e. Interpretive Competence
May a fact finder permissibly draw an inference about the cor-
rectness of a witness' interpretation of the meaning of a gesture or
phrase based upon the witness' race? About the witness' knowledge
of a neighborhood or the culture of a group? I think not, with the
possible exception of perceptions of prejudice, for which there is
empirical evidence suggesting that members of the racial majority
are less adept at detecting.4 8 With respect to other interpretive ques-
tions, I doubt that reliance upon race, without more evidence, could
meet the strict scrutiny standard.459
B. Mechanisms for Enforcing Prohibited Race
and Credibility Inferences
This is the easy part. I could be mistaken in some of my appli-
cations of equal protection doctrine to specific arguments, but I do
not see how I could be mistaken in asserting that equal protection
arguments constrain race and credibility inferences made by juries
and courts. If there are such constraints, two kinds of remedies for
the violation of those constraints practically suggest themselves.
1. Incorporating Constraints on Race and Credibility
Inferences into Existing Legal Mechanisms
Once rules for judging which race and credibility inferences are
forbidden have been deduced from equal protection doctrine, incor-
poration of those standards into existing remedial legal devices
should not be difficult.
458. Steven A. Rollman, The Sensitivity of Black and White Americans to Nonverbal
Cues of Prejudice, 105 J. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 73 (1978); Martin F. Sherman et al., Racial
and Gender Differences in Perceptions of Fairness: When Race is Involved in a Job Promo-
tion, 57 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLs 719 (1983).
459. I am, of course, not knowledgeable about all of these subjects. The permis-
sibility of other such accuracy arguments is not precluded, but a heavy burden of
justification would rest on the proponent.
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a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
If a defendant's lawyer screens the witnesses he will present to
the jury based upon an inference about race and credibility that
would be forbidden to the fact finder, and if the use of that screening
inference has harmed the defendant, I do not see how counsel can be
said to have provided effective assistance. In other words, I do not
think that making a racial generalization (as opposed to witness-
specific claims) about credibility (other than those few that are sup-
ported by narrowly tailored means) is sound trial strategy. At the
very least, it is not sound trial strategy to refuse to investigate a claim
or interview a witness (as I think the trial lawyer in Drayton did)4 °
because of a presumption that racial propensity casts doubt upon
the witness' testimony. Nor can I imagine how it could be sound
trial strategy to refuse to present a claim at all because of an as-
sumption that the fact finder will discredit the witness' testimony
based on a racial generalization. It might be otherwise with choices
among witnesses who could testify to the same things.
If one imagines some extreme factual situation in which the re-
fusal to investigate or present a claim based on the race of the
witness actually was the right strategic choice, then an assistance of
counsel claim would almost certainly fail due to an inability to show
prejudice. The Supreme Court has offered three justifications for the
enormous deference ordinarily given to counsels' choice as to trial
strategy, and none of them carry much weight here. First, the Court
has said that there are countless means of providing effective assis-
tance in any given case,"' but this does not mean that an attorney's
racially motivated decision not to investigate or not to put any wit-
nesses on the stand should be among those countless ways. Second,
the Court has said that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must
meet a high standard to avoid proliferation of such claims, 2 but I
find it difficult to believe that race-based failures to investigate or
put on a defense are common. If such failure are common, surely
this degree of racism in the defense bar only furthers the argument
for increased judicial oversight in this area. Finally, the Court has
said that in the absence of deference, a defense attorney's willing-
ness to represent criminal defendants and his performance in such
representation could be adversely affected,4 but it is difficult to be-
lieve that this subset of ineffective assistance claims would deter
many lawyers or impair many performances.
460. See supra Part I.B.3.
461. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1983).




b. Inflammatory Questions and Arguments
If a question or an argument implies an assertion that violates
the Equal Protection Clause, then that question or argument is
clearly impermissible. Delineation of those inferences that are consti-
tutionally forbidden should aid lower courts in some of their
sorting, although it will not complete their task because some oth-
erwise permissible inferences may be phrased in impermissibly
inflammatory language. The appropriate remedy for an impermis-
sible question or argument is another matter. As I have argued
elsewhere, I believe that the use of racial imagery of any kind
should, as a matter of statute, lead to the right to a mistrial, and the
automatic reversal of a conviction if a mistrial has not been of-
fered.4" I do not believe that an automatic reversal/mistrial standard
is constitutionally mandated, although I do believe that a much
greater degree of care in harmless error findings is.
c. Juror Misconduct Allegations
I am sympathetic toward Professor Alschuler's general view
that too much concern is placed on the symbols of jury selection and
too little attention paid to the substantive outcomes produced by the
jury. 4 His criticism of the Supreme Court's refusal to hear allega-
tions of juror abuse of alcohol, marijuana and cocaine seem to me on
the mark. But whatever the proper balance between finality and
fairness when racial bias is not at stake, it seems to me that a special
case can be made for permitting the impeachment of verdicts where
racial bias, related to credibility or otherwise, is involved. The injus-
tice done to an individual whose guilt is wrongly ascertained may
be the same regardless of the cause of the mistake, but this country's
history of racially biased guilt adjudications6 argues that the
prevalence of such injustices is quite different.
Put differently, race-based decisions get strict scrutiny and
other decisions--even very bad ones-do not. So at least where
statements and inferences have been made that, if acted upon,
would constitute impermissible race discrimination, I think that the
Fourteenth Amendment compels hearing the claim that the jury's
ultimate decision was attributable to race and reversing the
464. Johnson, supra note 298, at 1797-1803.
465. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989).
466. See supra Part I.A.
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conviction if the state cannot show that the decision would have
been the same regardless of the impermissible racial factor. 7
d. Habeas Corpus Review of State Factual Findings
Ordinarily, federal courts must defer to state court findings.
This presumption does not apply when a full and fair hearing has
been not been provided.6 What could be less "fair" than a hearing
in which racial discrimination influenced the trier of fact in his or
her findings? Thus, a federal court, upon an allegation of racially
biased fact-finding, must assess the truth of that allegation, and if
the allegation is true, must hold a new hearing on the merits of the
underlying claim. This is true as a matter of statutory interpretation,
but as I shall demonstrate below, such a result would be required
even if the statute did not predicate deference upon a full and fair
hearing.
2. Creating a Mechanism for Constraining Unconstitutional
Credibility Determinations
Although existing mechanisms may control some uses of race in
credibility determinations, they cannot control the most important
and probably the most frequent kind. The information that we have
about racial stereotypes and about modem forms and manifestations
of prejudice suggests that the silent-and sometimes even subcon-
scious-inferences of jurors will often be tainted racial
generalizations, yet the influence of such inferences on jurors is not
subject to challenge through any existing legal mechanism. Moreo-
ver, just as there is no vehicle to challenge the inferences of the first
and most important fact finder, there is no vehicle to challenge the
reasoning of the last possible fact finder, the federal district court
judge.
In several other contexts, the errors made by the jury in the
Clarence Brandley case" or by the district court judge in the Barry
Fairchild case 47 would be viewed as evidence of discrimination. If
evidence of disparate impact, unusual outcomes, deviations from
467. I am inclined to go further: when it can be shown that race has tainted the
decision-making process, whether or not the result would have been the same, I
would like to see a new trial ordered. I do not think, however, that the Constitution
mandates this, at least not under existing equal protection doctrine.
468. See supra notes 398-402 and accompanying text (describing full and fair
hearing requirement in light of the 1996 revision of the habeas statute).
469. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
470. See supra Part I.B.2.
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normal procedures, contemporary statements or historical back-
ground were shown in a case challenging a governmental
employment decision, a zoning decision, a redistricting decision, or
a peremptory challenge, a reviewing court would need to make a
determination of whether or not a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination had been made; if it had, the government would have to
rebut the inference of racial discrimination or reverse its decision.
The failure of a jury or a judge to assess credibility without
forbidden racial discrimination is no less serious than government
employment or zoning decisions, where challenges to discrimination
are well established. On the contrary, "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment's mandate that race discrimination be eliminated from all
official acts and proceedings of the State is most compelling in the
judicial system." If this principle justifies establishing a procedure
for enforcing constitutional constraints on jury selection, it certainly
justifies establishing a procedure for enforcing constitutional con-
straints on jury decision making.
McCleskey v. Kemp is not to the contrary.4 2 In McCleskey, the
Court ruled that the statistical evidence, gathered from a large num-
ber of cases and reflecting the choices of a number of decision
makers, did not prove racial discrimination, at least not in any par-
ticular defendant's case. McCleskey assumes, however, that a
defendant is free to show that racial discrimination invalidates his
jury determination; it also counsels that proof of discrimination
473
should be specific to the defendant's case.
It is true that proving racial discrimination in the assessment of
credibility in individual cases will not be easy. I would expect that
proving discrimination usually would be more difficult with respect
to jury decisions than with respect to judge's decisions, because a
defendant has less information about the jury's decision-making
process and rationale. Nevertheless, some jury cases may approach
"stark pattern" evidence; in others, disparate impact evidence may
be bolstered by juror testimony or extra-judicial accounts. Either
situation will sometimes allow a defendant to establish a prima facie
case. The fact that defendants will only rarely be able to establish a
prima facie case hardly argues that the law should ignore judges' or
juries' racially biased credibility assessments when they are able to
471. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
472. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). I do not defend McCleskey but
merely distinguish it; even if the McCleskey majority is correct, the validity of a claim
of racial discrimination in an individual case is not implicated by the Court's reason-
ing. For my views on McCleskey, see Johnson, supra note 356.
473. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93.
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do so. Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the
government should of course be permitted to rebut the claim.
I have argued above that there should be an opportunity to al-
lege and prove racially biased credibility determinations, but I have
not yet specified precisely the procedural vehicle that should be cre-
ated or adapted to provide the opportunity. At this point, I am not
terribly concerned with that question, although I certainly hope I
may be later. Batson provides one model for a procedural vehicle:
developing a separate hearing. 44 Another possibility would be to
superimpose equal protection constraints on the litigation of other
issues; arguments about race and credibility inferences could be in-
corporated into legal sufficiency arguments or into arguments about
whether the record supports a lower court's factual findings.
Whether or not a separate proceeding is designed, precedent
from Batson cases may aid in determining whether or not a prima
facie case of racially biased credibility determination has been estab-
lished.47 Perhaps the original Arlington Heights list of probative
factors might be expanded based on the nearly twenty years of
lower court experience in applying this "not exclusive" list.4 6 Such a
revised list could reflect recent advances in our knowledge about
how racist thinking reveals itself.
477
Whatever the precise form of the mechanism, some mechanism
must be recognized. Consider how Fairchild's lawyers concluded
their petition for rehearing:
Before the court decides whether to carry out Mr.
Fairchild's sentence, the Court owes it to Mr. Fairchild and
to the community to give its full attention to the
unmistakable appearance that the district court made its
decision on the basis of race. Without that, there will be no
assurance that race did not determine the outcome in this
case. There will only be the haunting and substantial
appearance that it did.478
474. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
475. The motion for rehearing en banc in Barry Lee Fairchild's case argued that
several factors that are relevant in Batson cases had parallels in the judge's findings
in Fairchild. See Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Fairchild v. Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1992).
476. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work? 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991) (reviewing the fac-
tors that seem to predict success in race discrimination claims).
477. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1978).
478. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Fairchild v.
Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1992).
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In Mr. Fairchild's case, there will always be that haunting and
substantial appearance.
CONCLUSION
I have often worried in the middle of a project that everything
that I have said is self-evident, and I am surprised when people
think my proposals are radical. This time, though, my proposals
really are modest. It must be almost self-evident that if you have a
right to show that racial discrimination denied you employment,
then you must also have a right to show racial discrimination denied
you liberty or is about to deny you life.
If I were a government employer, and I had two recommenda-
tions in front of me, both written by the same African American
applicant and both containing the exact same words, but one was
written for a white man and one written for an African American,
then surely I could not decide to hire the white man by reasoning
that an interracial recommendation was more likely to be true. Yet,
is that not what the Supreme Court seems to say in Schlup: at the
margin, interracial recommendations are more credible.
47
If I were a white government employer, and I received six let-
ters of recommendation for an African American candidate, all
written by African Americans, and one letter of recommendation for
a white candidate written by a white person, and the African Ameri-
can recommenders seemed to know more about their candidate than
the white recommender knew about his, surely an inquiry into why
I chose the white candidate would be appropriate. Yet, Drayton in-
volved similarly disparate evidence. If it were then discovered that
I had supported egregious racial discrimination in the public sphere
in the past and that I continue to belong to private white clubs,
would I expect my employment decision to be upheld?
If the costs of inquiry are worth the candle in employment de-
cisions, then they must be worth the candle in an arena where
stronger stereotypes and greater stakes are at play. Surely a criminal
defendant must be allowed to reverse a decision about his guilt or
about the validity of his conviction if he can show that the decision
depended upon constitutionally prohibited inferences from race to
credibility.
Reviewing the history and modem scope of the uses of race in
credibility decisions, one cannot avoid the conclusion that virtually
all of the forbidden inferences have been used to disadvantage Black
479. See supra Part I.B.4.c.ii.
480. See supra Part I.B.3.
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witnesses or Black defendants. Given the racial make-up of most ju-
ries, this may not be surprising. Given the overwhelmingly uni-
directional nature of race and credibility inferences, a refusal to
permit challenges to racially skewed credibility determinations
would lead to another conclusion: the only color of legal truth is
(still) white.
